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NOTES
The Authorization Continuum:
Investigating the Meaning of
“Authorization” Through the Lens
of the Controlled Substances Act
Federal prohibitions are ubiquitous in society. These prohibitions
may be absolute, providing no exceptions, or they may be qualified,
providing exemptions that allow specified parties to avoid a law’s reach.
The power to exempt parties from a prohibition is not limited to the
federal government; it may be delegated to states or smaller polities as
well. This is the structure that Congress employed when enacting the
Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act: the Act bans, among other
things, the sale and distribution of drug paraphernalia but provides an
exemption for “any person authorized by local, State, or Federal law.”
While the Act’s exemption may appear unambiguous at first
blush, interpretive difficulty ensues when one asks what is required of a
state or locality to “authorize” federally prohibited conduct. This
difficulty is troublesome given the significance that attaches to whether
a party is considered “authorized.” In states that have legalized
marijuana, paraphernalia businesses are engaging in federally
unlawful conduct until deemed authorized by state law, and a lack of
authorization can result in devastating consequences. The importance of
whether a party meets the Act’s authorization exemption thus warrants
a more nuanced understanding of what is required to “authorize”
prohibited conduct.
But the law lacks such an understanding—not only in the context
of the Paraphernalia Control Act but in other areas as well. This Note
aims to provide a framework for discerning what actions are sufficient
to authorize otherwise prohibited conduct. It submits that authorization
exists along a continuum: it may be affirmative, more implicit, or
inherent. By understanding the full range of meanings that
authorization may take, the law will be better equipped to provide a more
complete answer when determining whether a party is “authorized.”
1335
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INTRODUCTION
Federal prohibitions are ubiquitous in society.1 These
prohibitions are often sweeping in nature, taking the form of absolute
1.
Consider, for example, federal prohibitions related to workers’ safety; prohibitions on
specific trade-related activities under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (2012); and prohibitions
on certain types of contract terms. See Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV.
229, 230 (1998) (listing examples). Consumer protection law alone includes myriad prohibitions,
including, for example, prohibitions related to advertising and labeling of tobacco products, see
15 U.S.C. §§ 4401–4408 (2012); debt collection practices, see Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2012); credit repair services, see Credit Repair Organizations Act,
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bans that include no exemptions and frequently attach significant
penalties to violations.2 But Congress sometimes chooses to qualify
these bans by “authorizing” certain parties to engage in otherwise
prohibited activities or by delegating this power to states or localities.
While seemingly benign, the term “authorized” carries
significant weight. Prohibitions often entail staggering penalties for
violations, including not only monetary sanctions but imprisonment as
well. As such, how a decisionmaker interprets the term may determine
a person’s freedom or a business’s viability. Even if an individual is not
charged with violating a federal prohibition, negative consequences
may automatically attach as a result of the prohibited activity’s
“unlawful” status.3 Accurately determining whether a party has been
“authorized” to engage in otherwise unlawful conduct thus necessitates
a comprehensive understanding of the term.
And yet the law lacks such an understanding. Decisionmakers
disagree on whether authorization may be inferred from surrounding
circumstances or whether more formal, affirmative permission is
required. Some have even posited that conduct is authorized so long as
it is not prohibited. This Note aims to elucidate the matter by providing
a framework for understanding how the term “authorized” should be
interpreted.
Authorization, this Note submits, exists along a continuum of
possible meanings, with affirmative authorization at one end of the
continuum and authorization through inaction at the other. Affirmative
authorization, likely the most familiar form, involves a direct, positive
empowerment to act. Statutory authorizations and licensing regimes
frequently fall on this side of the continuum. Authorization through
inaction, on the other hand, considers conduct inherently authorized
unless it is expressly prohibited or regulated (or has been in the past).
Between these two ends exists a range of implied forms of authorization
that depend on the circumstances surrounding a particular prohibition.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1679–1679j (2012); lending services, see Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1667f (2012); telemarketing, see Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6108 (2012); protection of minors, see, e.g., Sports Agent Responsibility and
Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801–7807 (2012); and discrimination against customers in certain
industries, see, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012).
2.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 115 (2012) (prohibiting actions that impede, intimidate, or interfere
with any U.S. official, U.S. judge, or law enforcement officer engaged in official activities);
18 U.S.C. § 2339C (2012) (prohibiting the knowing finance of terrorist activities); 21 U.S.C. § 331
(2012) (prohibiting, among other things, “receipt in interstate commerce of any food, drug, device,
tobacco product, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded, and the delivery or proffered
delivery thereof”).
3.
See infra Section I.C.2 (discussing consequences that automatically attach to violation of
the Paraphernalia Control Act).
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The breadth of forms that authorization may take remains
largely unexplored in the literature and by the courts. This may be
because scholars and courts have presumed that authorization must be
affirmative, but this position was recently rejected by the Supreme
Court in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, which held
that a state’s repeal of a prohibition constitutes authorization by law.4
But the Court did not explicate the meaning of authorization further,
thus leaving open the question of what other actions constitute
authorization by law. This Note seeks to fill that gap by providing the
authorization continuum as a comprehensive framework for
understanding what authorization requires.
To illustrate the need for such a framework and how it might
inform decisionmaking, this Note investigates the term “authorized” as
used in the Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act
(“Paraphernalia Control Act”).5 The Act prohibits certain
paraphernalia-related activities,6 but this prohibition is not absolute; it
includes an exemption that allows those “authorized by local, State, or
Federal law” to engage in the otherwise prohibited conduct.7
States’ ability to authorize federally prohibited paraphernaliarelated activities is of special import given the surge of states that have
legalized marijuana. While marijuana is federally prohibited, every
state but one has legalized the drug in some form.8 Of those, ten states
plus the District of Columbia have done so for recreational use.9 These
states have largely failed, however, to legalize the sale, distribution,
and manufacture of marijuana paraphernalia. But the broad, allencompassing definition of “paraphernalia” used in the Paraphernalia
Control Act necessitates doing so.
Paraphernalia, as statutorily defined, covers a wide assortment
of items used to prepare, conceal, and ingest controlled substances.10
The term is not limited to conventional notions of paraphernalia—
pipes, bongs, and other instrumentalities of use—but includes the
proverbial “picks and shovels” of the drug industry as well. In the
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

138 S. Ct. 1461, 1474 (2018); see infra Section II.C.1.
21 U.S.C. § 863 (2012).
Id. § 863(a).
Id. § 863(f)(1).
See Robert A. Mikos, Only One State Has Not Yet Legalized Marijuana in Some Form . . . ,
VAND. U. (July 16, 2018), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/07/only-one-state-has-notyet-legalized-marijuana-in-some-form [https://perma.cc/3HDD-6ALM] (noting that only Iowa
continues to prohibit all forms of marijuana).
9.
See Robert A. Mikos, Update: Voters in 3 of 4 States Approve Marijuana Legalization
Measures, VAND. U. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/11/updatevoters-in-3-of-4-states-approve-marijuana-legalization-measures [https://perma.cc/7VCG-UFRR].
10. 21 U.S.C. § 863(d); see also infra Section I.B.2.
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context of the marijuana industry, this means that items such as
fertilizers, irrigation systems, and lighting technology marketed to
marijuana cultivators are prohibited by federal law. States’ failure to
take advantage of the authorization exemption forces industry
participants to deal with the many enumerated and unenumerated
consequences that stem from violation of the Paraphernalia Control
Act. Even if these actors are not prosecuted or fined under the Act,11
several negative consequences automatically attach to any business or
person engaging in prohibited conduct. For instance, marijuana
paraphernalia businesses may not register federal trademarks because
paraphernalia is considered unlawful commerce.12 Likewise, otherwise
valid contracts may be found unenforceable when they relate to
paraphernalia, since such items are unlawful and enforcement may
therefore be against public policy.13 Most detrimentally, marijuana
paraphernalia businesses are limited in their ability to secure banking
due to federal anti-money laundering laws.14
But the Paraphernalia Control Act presents a mechanism for
easily protecting paraphernalia-industry participants from these
consequences. The Act’s authorization exemption allows state and local
governments to authorize conduct otherwise prohibited: “This section
shall not apply to . . . any person authorized by local, State, or Federal
law to manufacture, possess, or distribute [paraphernalia].”15
Constraining the provision’s seemingly plain meaning, however, is the
uncertainty presented by the term “authorized.” Decisionmakers have
thus far rejected arguments by paraphernalia-industry participants
that they fall within the authorization exemption’s scope.16 This context
illustrates the need for a better understanding of what actions are
sufficient to “authorize” conduct and offers a unique lens through which
to view the term’s meaning.
This Note’s objective is twofold: First, it seeks to ease the
interpretive difficulty of the term “authorized” by presenting a
framework of forms that authorization may take. Second, it aims to
provide states with a better understanding of how the Paraphernalia
Control Act’s authorization exemption can be employed. This Note

11. For a discussion of the penalties expressly enumerated in the Paraphernalia Control Act,
see infra Section I.C.1.
12. See infra Section I.C.2.a.
13. See infra Section I.C.2.c.
14. See infra Section I.C.2.b.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 863(f)(1) (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, Crim. No. L-00-033, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107118
(D. Md. Nov. 16, 2009); CannaKorp, Inc. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2017); In re Ultra Trimmer, L.L.C., No. 86479070, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 563 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2016).
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proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines the Act’s legal framework and
the consequences that attach to violations. Part II introduces the
authorization continuum as a tool for understanding the meaning of
authorization. It explains that rather than enjoying a single, inherent
meaning, authorization may take many forms. Part III then applies the
forms of authorization explored in Part II to the Paraphernalia Control
Act’s authorization exemption. This Part outlines how each form might
be treated by legal decisionmakers and asks why the law might prefer
some forms of authorization over others.
I. WHY AUTHORIZATION MATTERS: THE FEDERAL MARIJUANA
PARAPHERNALIA PROHIBITION
The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”)17 was enacted in 1970 as
a means of regulating the sale, manufacture, and use of certain
substances deemed impermissible for the general population.18 The Act
classifies substances into five schedules with varying levels of
restriction based on the substance’s potential for abuse, therapeutic
value, and safety.19 Schedule I is the most restrictive category;
substances in this category are prohibited by law and may not be
prescribed by a physician.20 Substances in Schedules II through V, on
the other hand, are recognized as having at least some medical value
and may be legally distributed.21
Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I substance, making it
unlawful for any person to knowingly possess, dispense, distribute, or
manufacture it.22 While prohibited by federal law, marijuana has been
17. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971).
18. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012) (congressional findings); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1, 12–13 (2005) (explaining that the CSA was enacted with the express purpose of “conquer[ing]
drug abuse” and “control[ling] the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances”).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2012); see also Brian M. Blumenfeld, State Legalization of Marijuana
and Our American System of Federalism: A Historio-Constitutional Primer, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 77, 84–85 (2017) (explaining the CSA schedules). The CSA authorizes the Attorney General to
classify and reschedule substances under the CSA, and the Attorney General has delegated that
responsibility to the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). See 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2012)
(delegation to Attorney General); 28 C.F.R. § 0.100 (2019) (delegation to DEA); see also Ams. for
Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (discussing this regulating
structure).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 812. The ban on Schedule I substances includes a very narrow exception for
investigative research, which must be approved by the Food and Drug Administration after
submission of a research protocol. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.18 (2019). If approved, research is tightly
controlled. Id. §§ 1301.33, .42.
21. 21 U.S.C. § 829(a)–(c) (2012); see also Ams. for Safe Access, 706 F.3d at 441 (noting that
“[u]nlike Schedule I drugs, federal law permits individuals to obtain Schedule II, III, IV, or V drugs
for personal medical use with a valid prescription”).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012) (prohibited acts).
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legalized in some form by nearly every state.23 To date, ten states and
the District of Columbia have legalized marijuana for recreational
use,24 and twenty-three states have legalized it for medical use.25
While states have moved to legalize marijuana-related
activities, many have failed to take the additional step of legalizing
activities related to marijuana paraphernalia. While federal law
prohibits the sale, distribution, and importation of such items,26 this
prohibition provides a work-around: it includes an exemption for “any
person authorized by local, State, or Federal law.”27 As this Part
illustrates, the law attaches much significance to the term “authorized.”
Whether a person is authorized to engage in paraphernalia-related
conduct determines the lawfulness of that person’s actions and thus the
consequences she faces. By authorizing conduct, states ensure that
industry participants can avoid both enumerated penalties—
imprisonment, forfeiture of property, and fines—and unenumerated
consequences that attach as a result of paraphernalia’s status as
“unlawful”—for example, the inability to receive federal trademark
protection, barriers to banking, and difficulty enforcing contracts.
Through authorization, states minimize the risk otherwise faced by
marijuana paraphernalia businesses. The federal paraphernalia
prohibition thus illustrates the importance of properly understanding
the term “authorized.” This Part begins by outlining the federal
paraphernalia prohibition, including the regulatory regime that
preceded it, and then turns to the consequences that automatically
attach to paraphernalia-related activities as a result of the prohibition.
A. Paraphernalia Regulation: The Model Act
When enacting the CSA, Congress chose to abstain from
regulating drug paraphernalia, instead leaving the field to the states.28
In response, many states criminalized the sale of drug paraphernalia
via statute, but these statutes often crumbled under constitutional
23. See Mikos, supra note 8 (noting that forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
legalized either recreational marijuana, medical marijuana, or cannabidiol (“CBD”)).
24. See Mikos, supra note 9.
25. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 5, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZD6TNGFR].
26. 21 U.S.C. § 863(a) (2012).
27. Id. § 863(f)(1).
28. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG PARAPHERNALIA: FEDERAL PROSECUTION MANUAL 1
(1991), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/134764NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BG3P9U7] [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL] (explaining that federal paraphernalia legislation was not urged
“because it was not thought to represent the most efficient or sensible allocation of federal drug
enforcement resources”).
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challenges.29 At the request of multiple states, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) set out to create a regime that would withstand
constitutional scrutiny. This effort resulted in the 1979 Model Drug
Paraphernalia Act (“Model Act”), which was developed to serve as a
guide for states in their efforts to control the drug paraphernalia
trade.30 The Model Act banned the possession, sale, manufacture, and
advertisement of drug paraphernalia31 and was widely adopted.32
Despite the federal prohibition on controlled substances and states’
prohibition on drug paraphernalia, drug use persisted.33 The lack of a
federal paraphernalia prohibition was eventually blamed for the
continued proliferation of drugs, and policymakers determined that
closing the legislative gap on paraphernalia was necessary to address
the nation’s ongoing drug crisis.34
29. See id. (citing cases); MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT prefatory note (U.S. DRUG ENF’T
ADMIN. 1979) (“[S]tate laws aimed at controlling Drug Paraphernalia are often too vaguely worded
and too limited in coverage to withstand constitutional attack or to be very effective.”), reprinted
in Drug Paraphernalia: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96th
Cong. 88 (1979).
30. See MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT prefatory note (“This Model Act was drafted, at
the request of state authorities, to enable states and local jurisdictions to cope with the
paraphernalia problem.”).
31. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 28, at 1.
32. The Model Act was “adopted in some form in thirty-eight states and the District of
Columbia.” United States v. Mishra, 979 F.2d 301, 303 (3d Cir. 1992).
33. See, e.g., Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 412 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Drug abuse has become
epidemic . . . .”); Slettvet v. State, 280 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ind. 1972) (“We take judicial notice of the
frightening rise of illicit drug use occurring in this country which is rapidly approaching epidemic
proportions.”).
34. See 132 CONG. REC. 26451 (1986) (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson) (calling the lack of a
federal drug paraphernalia ban “one of the gaping holes in existing law”). Paraphernalia’s
purported promotion and glamorization of drug use was considered a central reason for the drug
epidemic. See Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 1625 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 51 (1986) [hereinafter
Paraphernalia Control Act Hearing] (statement of Rep. Charles B. Rangel, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control) (claiming that the drug paraphernalia industry has
“traditionally glamorized and promoted, [and] encouraged drug use”); 132 CONG. REC. 22921
(statement of Rep. Mel Levine) (contending that “[t]he drug paraphernalia industry both
glamorizes the use of illegal drugs and contributes to the problem of drug abuse” and that reform
efforts would “reemphasiz[e] that society is completely opposed to any glamorization or acceptance
of dangerous drug use”).
Beyond concerns related to paraphernalia’s alleged promotion of drug use, Congress considered
it morally condemnable that drug use had spurred a profitable industry—one large enough to
generate industry publications and trade associations with lobbying power. See Steven E. Gersten,
Drug Paraphernalia: Illustrative of the Need for Federal-State Cooperation in Law Enforcement in
an Era of New Federalism, 26 SW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1074 (1997) (explaining that the industry’s
trade associations “lobb[ied] against proposed anti-paraphernalia legislation” and “challenge[d]
the constitutionality of enacted statutes”). While no congressional member submitted evidence
related to the paraphernalia industry’s profits, estimates for the years leading up to the
Paraphernalia Control Act’s enactment ranged from $3 to $18 billion. See, e.g., Drugs—The Effects
on the Black Community: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control,
98th Cong. 26 (1984) (statement of Ronald Dougherty, Executive Director, Benjamin Rush Center)
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Two principal concerns animated efforts to enact a ban on drug
paraphernalia. First, the paraphernalia industry was able to evade
state regulation by using the interstate mail system to advertise, sell,
and transport paraphernalia.35 This “mail order” paraphernalia was
considered “a deliberate attempt to circumvent State and local law
enforcement efforts to control the sale of paraphernalia.”36 Because
state laws were only effective at targeting paraphernalia retailers
operating within a state and were unable to reach nonresident
manufacturers or distributors, states had difficulty regulating
interstate paraphernalia.37 Second, by placing a federal ban on drugs
while not banning drug paraphernalia, Congress feared that it
communicated to the public that using drugs was acceptable.38 On this
view, inconsistencies in federal drug laws evinced an “institutional
hypocrisy” that indicated a relaxed approach to drug regulation.39
Congress was also concerned that the continued legality of interstate
channels for paraphernalia trafficking reinforced the notion that
policymakers were apathetic toward drug use.40 Thus, Congress
determined that if drugs were to be eradicated, a federal solution to the
prevalence of paraphernalia was required.

(estimating annual industry profits of $18 billion); 132 CONG. REC. 22921 (statement of Rep. Mel
Levine) (estimating annual industry profits of $3 billion).
35. 131 CONG. REC. 5828 (1985); see also DOJ MANUAL, supra note 28, at 3 (describing the
rising availability of drug paraphernalia due to the widespread use of mail and private package
services).
36. Paraphernalia Control Act Hearing, supra note 34, at 16 (statement of Rep. Mel Levine,
Member, H. Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control).
37. See Gersten, supra note 34, at 1084 (1997) (“State and local paraphernalia laws generally
were used only against retailers, and were powerless to regulate out-of-state manufacturers and
distributors.”); id. at 1084 n.109 (“[S]tates are powerless to prohibit interstate or mail order
activity per se since only the United States Congress is empowered under the federal Constitution
to regulate interstate commerce and to establish Post Offices.”).
38. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 22921 (statement of Rep. Mel Levine) (“The open sale of drug
paraphernalia misleads many young Americans to believe that drugs are acceptable to use.
Advertisements . . . sell the idea that drug use is a normal and acceptable activity.”); see also
Paraphernalia Control Act Hearing, supra note 33, at 168 (statement of Irvin B. Nathan, Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (claiming that the existence
of “head shops” and other “open advertisement[s]” for paraphernalia affected the public’s
perception of whether drug use was acceptable).
39. 132 CONG. REC. 23096 (statement of Sen. William V. Roth, Jr.).
40. 132 CONG. REC. 22921 (statement of Rep. Mel Levine) (“A further danger . . . is the idea
that if drug paraphernalia can be openly sold through the mails, then society is not serious about
enforcing drug laws, that the health risks are not really so great, and that the legal consequences
are not serious.”).
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B. Paraphernalia Prohibition:
The Paraphernalia Control Act
To control the trafficking of paraphernalia, Congress enacted the
Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act of 1986.41 The Act
enumerates three prohibited paraphernalia-related activities: (1) the
sale or offer for sale of paraphernalia, (2) the use of interstate commerce
to transport paraphernalia, and (3) the import or export of
paraphernalia.42 While manufacture of paraphernalia is not expressly
prohibited by the Act, courts have allowed indictments based on
manufacture alone.43 Further, manufacturing paraphernalia for profit
necessarily implicates the Act’s express prohibition on sales and offers
for sale. Possession of paraphernalia, however, is not federally
prohibited.44 This Section begins by detailing the Paraphernalia
Control Act’s authorization exemption and then explains the broad
scope of what items are considered “paraphernalia” under the Act.
Section I.C takes up the consequences of engaging in conduct prohibited
by the Act.
1. The Authorization Exemption
The Paraphernalia Control Act’s prohibition on paraphernalia is
not absolute. The Act includes an exemption for “any person authorized
by local, State, or Federal law to manufacture, possess, or distribute
such items.”45 Because Congress enacted the Paraphernalia Control Act
as part of an omnibus bill, there is scant legislative history regarding

41. 21 U.S.C. § 863 (2012); see also Paraphernalia Control Act Hearing, supra note 34, at 6
(statement of Rep. William J. Hughes, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (describing the Paraphernalia Control Act as “another chapter in our effort to try to
provide whatever tools are reasonably needed to the law enforcement community in trying to deal
with this national malaise”).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 863(a).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Dyer, 750 F. Supp. 1278, 1298–99 (E.D. Va. 1990) (holding that
a manufacturer may be charged under the Paraphernalia Control Act).
44. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1985 (2015) (“Federal law criminalizes the sale of or
commerce in drug paraphernalia, but possession alone is not criminalized at all.”). Some courts,
however, have erroneously interpreted the Act to prohibit possession. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Micks,
No. 1:14-CV-3522 (NJV), 2014 WL 6241217, at *5 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 863(f)(1) (emphasis added). The Act also includes an exemption for items
“traditionally intended for use with tobacco products” from the Paraphernalia Control Act’s reach.
21 U.S.C. § 863(f)(2). To determine whether an item is intended for tobacco use or for use with a
controlled substance, courts look to objective factors rather than a defendant’s subjective intent.
See Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 520–21 (1994) (“An item’s ‘traditional’
use is not based on the subjective intent of a particular defendant.”); see also infra Section I.B.2
(discussing factors used in determining whether an item is unlawful paraphernalia).
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the authorization exemption. As a result, little is known about how
Congress intended the provision to operate.46
As originally introduced, the Act did not contain exemptions for
use,47 but both chambers of Congress later proposed early versions of
the authorization exemption. Both versions delineated specific
purposes for which prohibited conduct would be authorized: The House
bill exempted from its scope paraphernalia “for medical or scientific
needs”48 and was likely intended to address a narrow exception in the
CSA that allows for federally approved investigative research into the
effects of controlled substances.49 The Senate bill, meanwhile, was
much more detailed; it listed professions that would be exempt from the
Act’s prohibitions.50 This version was likely in response to the myriad
everyday objects that fall within paraphernalia’s definition and the
perceived need for a safe harbor for industries dealing in objects that
could potentially be covered by that definition.51 These proposed
exemptions were eventually replaced with the current authorization
exemption—although the legislative history is equally quiet as to why
this version was preferred.
The more generalized exemption that was ultimately adopted
may indicate that Congress envisaged a broader role for the states in
regulating paraphernalia, as it had when drafting the Model Act.52 This
possibility is buttressed by pronouncements made by executive branch
officials that regulation was a matter best left to the states.53 During a
hearing on the appropriateness of federal regulation, a Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) representative indicated that because a federal ban on
drug paraphernalia would not represent an efficient allocation of
available federal resources, paraphernalia was not a priority for the
46. See United States v. 57,261 Items of Drug Paraphernalia, 705 F. Supp. 1256, 1264–65
(M.D. Tenn. 1988) (explaining that because of the omnibus nature of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, there is little legislative history related to the
Paraphernalia Control Act), aff’d, 869 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1989).
47. 131 CONG. REC. 5828–29 (1985) (as introduced in the Senate by Sen. Pete Wilson); see
also id. at 5932 (as introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Mel Levine).
48. 132 CONG. REC. 22878 (1986).
49. See supra note 20.
50. 132 CONG. REC. 25666–67. These exempted classes included “manufacturers,
wholesalers, jobbers, licensed medical technicians, technologists, nurses, hospitals, research
teaching institutions, clinical laboratories, medical doctors, osteopathic physicians, dentists,
chiropodists, veterinarians, pharmacists, or embalmers in the normal lawful course of their
respective businesses” and “common carriers or warehousers or their employees engaged in the
lawful transportation of such items.” Id.
51. See infra Section I.B.2 (discussing the Paraphernalia Control Act’s broad definition of
“paraphernalia”).
52. See supra Section I.A.
53. See Gersten, supra note 34, at 1081–82 (discussing the executive branch’s view that states
should be the primary actors in regulating paraphernalia).
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federal government.54 Instead, the DOJ encouraged states to “weigh all
the circumstances and decide whether it is in their best interests to
enact [legislation].”55 Representatives from the DEA likewise indicated
that regulation could “be done best at the State and local level” and that
states and local municipalities should be provided autonomy to
determine for themselves “what kind of environment, what kind of
streets, [and] what kind of neighborhoods, they want to have.”56
Importantly, Congress appeared to share this view for a time.57
In 1980, the House Select Committee on Narcotics issued a “find[ing]
that regulation of the paraphernalia industry can best be accomplished
at the State and local government levels.”58 When legislation mirroring
the Model Act was introduced into the Senate in 1981, it garnered little
support and ultimately died in committee.59 While it is unclear why the
legislation failed to gain traction, efforts by states to decriminalize
marijuana may have played a role.60
While the legislative history of the Paraphernalia Control Act is
sparse, the foregoing discussion suggests that Congress likely intended

54. See Drug Paraphernalia: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and
Control, 96th Cong. 33 (1979) (statement of Irvin B. Nathan, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice) (explaining that the DOJ preferred not to involve itself
in regulating drug paraphernalia because “[t]he Federal Government has limited resources” and
must “allocate those resources in the way [it] think[s] is best to attack the overall drug problem”);
see also id. at 35 (“The Department of Justice . . . does not view its responsibilities as making
specific recommendations to the State and local governments as to what is in their best interest.”).
55. Id. at 35.
56. Id. at 31 (statement of Peter B. Bensinger, Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration); see also id. (arguing that it was up to “communities . . . to develop and determine
how they are going to control their environment”); id. (“We believe the Model Act should be
discussed and reviewed by the individual jurisdictions, whether villages, cities, county
governments, or State governments.”).
57. See KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 105 (2013)
(“Executive expressions that precede legislative history, as normally understood, are part of a
statute’s context.”).
58. STAFF OF H. SELECT COMM. ON NARCOTICS ABUSE & CONTROL, 96TH CONG., REP. ON DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA 17 (Comm. Print 1980).
59. See Gersten, supra note 34, at 1082 (“A bill virtually identical to the Model Act was
introduced in 1981 by Senator John Tower, but the proposal generated little interest and died in
committee.”).
60. See Drug Paraphernalia: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and
Control, 96th Cong. 78–84 (1979) (statement of Sue Rusche, President, DeKalb Families in Action)
(discussing state efforts to decriminalize marijuana). State-level marijuana prohibition eroded
between President Nixon’s “War on Drugs” pronouncement and President Reagan’s anti-drug
“crusade,” in part due to a 1972 report released by the National Commission on Marihuana and
Drug Abuse declaring that use of marijuana was “not such a grave problem that individuals who
smoke marihuana, and possess it for that purpose, should be subject to criminal procedures.” JOHN
HUDAK, MARIJUANA: A SHORT HISTORY 59–61 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
report prompted eleven states to liberalize their marijuana laws. See Richard J. Bonnie, The
Surprising Collapse of Marijuana Prohibition: What Now?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 573, 576–86
(2016).
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the authorization exemption to permit states broad discretion to
authorize paraphernalia-related activities as they saw fit. This reading
comports with the general language used in the exemption.61 Even if
one accepts that Congress intended to allow states to authorize the
federally prohibited conduct at their discretion, it is still unclear what
actions are sufficient to constitute authorization for purposes of the Act.
This inquiry is taken up in Part II. But before discussing the meaning
of authorization, it is necessary to understand the significance of such
a determination. As the remainder of this Part demonstrates, the
prohibition on paraphernalia is far-reaching and imposes substantial
penalties—some enumerated and others attaching automatically to
paraphernalia’s unlawful status.
2. The Definition of “Paraphernalia”
The term “drug paraphernalia” is typically associated with the
traditional instrumentalities of drug use—bongs, pipes, needles, and so
forth. But the definition used in the Paraphernalia Control Act is far
more encompassing and brings a wider array of items into the statute’s
purview.62 This broad scope follows directly from the Model Act, which
purposefully included a broad definition of paraphernalia and served as
a guide for drafters of the Paraphernalia Control Act.63 Congress was
aware of the definition’s breadth; it was acknowledged during
legislative hearings that the definition would include “items other than
those used for drug connected purposes.”64

61. 21 U.S.C. § 863(f)(1) (2012) (“This section shall not apply to . . . any person authorized by
local, State, or Federal law to manufacture, possess, or distribute such [paraphernalia] items.”).
62. See Paraphernalia Control Act Hearing, supra note 34, at 61 (statement of Jack E.
Swagerty, Assistant Chief Postal Inspector for Criminal Investigations, U.S. Postal Inspection
Service) (noting that, as drafted, the Paraphernalia Control Act “may include items other than
those used for drug connected purposes”).
63. See MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT art. I cmt. (U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN. 1979)
(“Although this definition may appear too general in its wording, or too broad in its scope, there
are so many forms of drug paraphernalia that any attempt to define the term in more specific
language would guarantee major loopholes in the Act’s coverage.”), reprinted in Drug
Paraphernalia: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96th Cong.
88 (1979); see also Paraphernalia Control Act Hearing, supra note 34, at 15 (statement of Rep. Mel
Levine, Member, H. Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control) (explaining the Paraphernalia
Control Act was “drafted closely after” the Model Act); id. at 146 (statement of Lee Huddleston,
Att’y, Huddleston Brothers) (noting that the Model Act and Paraphernalia Control Act share the
same definition).
64. Paraphernalia Control Act Hearing, supra note 34, at 61 (statement of Jack E. Swagerty,
Assistant Chief Postal Inspector for Criminal Investigations, U.S. Postal Inspection Service).
While some have argued that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because of its scope, courts
have disagreed, holding that the broad character of the definition is not vulnerable to
constitutional challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Mishra, 979 F.2d 301, 308–09 (3d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Murphy, 977 F.2d 503, 506 (10th Cir. 1992).
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As defined by the Act, “drug paraphernalia” refers to any item
“primarily intended or designed for use in manufacturing,
compounding, converting, concealing, producing, processing, preparing,
injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human
body a controlled substance.”65 The statute recites a brief list of items
that fall under this definition.66 If not squarely within the enumerated
list, an item may still be considered paraphernalia when “designed” or
“primarily intended” for use with a controlled substance.67
An item is “designed” for use if its objective features establish
that it is “principally” used for making or consuming a controlled
substance.68 The Supreme Court has clarified that this determination
depends on the item’s true purpose as represented by the
manufacturer’s design intent rather than the retailer’s intent in selling
the item or the buyer’s intent in using it.69 In other words, no scienter
requirement exists for parties other than manufacturers.70 A focus on
the manufacturer’s design precludes consideration of any “contrived”
uses that litigants may propose in an attempt to circumvent the object’s
true purpose.71
Whether an item is “primarily intended” for use with controlled
substances likewise rests on objective considerations and does not
involve questions of the violator’s subjective intent. Despite indication
in the Act’s legislative history that Congress presumed the phrase
“primarily intended” would rest on subjective intent,72 the Supreme
Court has rejected this reading.73 Instead, the Court has determined
that whether an item is “primarily intended” for drug use depends on
whether the item is “likely” to be used with illicit drugs.74 This reading
was adopted based on the overall construction of the Paraphernalia
65. 21 U.S.C. § 863(d).
66. See id. (listing fifteen examples of drug paraphernalia); see also United States v. Search
of Music City Mktg., Inc., 212 F.3d 920, 924 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the list of items
included in the definition of paraphernalia is not exhaustive).
67. Specifically, the Paraphernalia Control Act prohibits items designed or primarily
intended for use “in manufacturing, compounding, converting, concealing, producing, processing,
preparing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a
controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 863(d).
68. Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 518 (1994).
69. See id. (establishing that the “ ‘designed . . . for use’ standard refer[s] to ‘the design of the
manufacturer, not the intent of the retailer or customer’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Village
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 501 (1982))).
70. See id.
71. Id. Examples of “contrived” uses include using a bong as a flower vase, a smoking pipe to
burn incense, or a roach clip as a barrette. See id. (providing examples).
72. See Paraphernalia Control Act Hearing, supra note 34, at 47–48 (statement of Rep. Mel
Levine, Member, H. Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control).
73. Posters ‘N’ Things, 511 U.S. at 522 n.12.
74. See id. at 518–21.
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Control Act, including the possibility that Congress envisioned the
“primarily intended” wording as referring to the intentions of parties
other than the party violating the Act—for example, the intentions of
the item’s manufacturer, distributor, retailer, buyer, or end user.75
The definition of paraphernalia is further broadened by the Act’s
directive to consider “all . . . logically relevant factors” when classifying
an item.76 Relevant factors include, for example, instructions,
descriptive materials, or advertisements accompanying or related to the
item in question; the manner in which the item is displayed; whether
the party in control of the item “is a legitimate supplier of like or related
items to the community,” such as items for use with tobacco; and expert
testimony on the item’s intended use.77 The breadth of factors that may
be considered enables prosecutors to rely entirely on circumstantial
evidence to prove a violation under the Paraphernalia Control Act.78
The expansive definition of paraphernalia may result in the
prohibition of otherwise lawful and commonplace objects. An airtight
container, for instance, is prohibited paraphernalia if the circumstances
surrounding its sale indicate that it was marketed for concealing a
controlled substance, regardless of whether the defendant intended to
use the item in that manner or sell it for that purpose.79 Crucially, the
picks and shovels of the marijuana industry fall within the definitional
scope as well. Because “paraphernalia” includes items used for
“manufacturing” marijuana, any item used to plant, cultivate, or
harvest marijuana is covered by the Act.80 The result is that the

75. Id.
76. 21 U.S.C. § 863(e) (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Ways, 832 F.3d 887, 894–95 (8th Cir.
2016) (holding that it was reasonable for a jury to conclude that items at issue constituted drug
paraphernalia after consideration of logically relevant factors); United States v. Search of Music
City Mktg., Inc., 212 F.3d 920, 927–28 (6th Cir. 2000) (relying on factors included in the
Paraphernalia Control Act in determining whether seized items constituted “drug
paraphernalia”).
77. 21 U.S.C. § 863(e). Online materials are frequently referenced in determining whether an
item should be considered unlawful paraphernalia. See e.g., In re Ultra Trimmer, L.L.C., No.
86479070, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 563, at *5–9 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2016) (relying on a product’s website
description to find that it met the definition of paraphernalia); In re Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1350, 1350–51, 1353 (T.T.A.B. 2016) (relying on the applicant’s website and photos of potential
retail storefronts).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Dyer, 750 F. Supp. 1278, 1281–82 (E.D. Va. 1990) (relying on
invoices to substantiate charges alleging a violation of the Paraphernalia Control Act); see also
DOJ MANUAL, supra note 28, at 28 (instructing prosecutors on how to bring charges against a
defendant using advertisements).
79. See Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 521 n.11 (1994) (explaining
this concept). This is true even if the defendant does not intend to use the purchased container for
use with a controlled substance. See id.
80. 21 U.S.C. § 863(d) (“The term ‘drug paraphernalia’ means any equipment, product, or
material of any kind which is primarily intended or designed for use in manufacturing . . . a
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products necessary for the proper functioning of the marijuana
industry—for instance, climate control and ventilation systems,
irrigation systems, lighting equipment, and fertilizers—are unlawful
items subject to the Paraphernalia Control Act’s enumerated penalties
and unenumerated consequences. Thus, the penalties that attach to
manufacturers and suppliers of pipes and bongs equally attach to
manufacturers and suppliers of marijuana Miracle-Gro and other
hydroponic products.81 For these businesses, being authorized by state
law to engage in prohibited activities can mean the difference between
a viable business venture and failure.
C. Paraphernalia Penalties:
The Consequences of Prohibition
The Paraphernalia Control Act, like most criminal drug
statutes, raises a host of unenumerated consequences in addition to the
Act’s specifically enumerated penalties. These unenumerated
consequences are not fixed upon a decisionmaker’s determination that
a party is guilty of violating the Act but instead attach automatically to
a party’s status as a manufacture, supplier, or distributor of
paraphernalia. This Section begins by exploring the Act’s enumerated
penalties and then proceeds to highlight three detrimental
consequences that accompany parties dealing in paraphernalia. While
this Note examines three consequences, this list is not exhaustive but
instead merely serves as an illustration of the adverse effects that may
result from marijuana paraphernalia’s unlawful status.
1. Enumerated Penalties
The Paraphernalia Control Act explicitly provides that violation
may result in imprisonment of up to three years, monetary fines, or
both.82 Because each individual transaction involving paraphernalia is
controlled substance . . . .” (emphasis added)). “Manufacturing” includes planting, cultivating,
harvesting, and preparing controlled substances. See id. § 802(15), (22).
81. See Kristine Owram, Scotts Miracle-Gro Tests Whether It Can Make Pot Grow Too,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-23/scotts-miraclegro-is-testing-whether-it-can-make-pot-grow-too [https://perma.cc/X8PF-JRUS] (discussing Scotts
Miracle-Gro’s entry into the hydroponic industry).
82. 21 U.S.C. § 863(b) (“Anyone convicted of an offense [in] this section shall be imprisoned
for not more than three years and fined under Title 18.”); see also BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL30722, DRUG OFFENSES: MAXIMUM FINES AND TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT FOR VIOLATION
OF THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AND RELATED LAWS 8 (2015) (placing the
maximum possible fine for violation of the Paraphernalia Control Act at $250,000). Additionally,
in lieu of the traditional fine, “a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense
may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds.” 21 U.S.C. § 855 (2012).
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a single violation of the Act, fines may be assessed for each piece of
paraphernalia sold or distributed.83 Marijuana paraphernalia
businesses are also subject to the provisions of the Money Laundering
Control Act, which prohibits certain financial transactions involving
“the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,” including activities
prohibited by the Paraphernalia Control Act.84 The penalties for money
laundering are even more substantial than penalties for violations of
the Paraphernalia Control Act—monetary fines are twice as large and
persons may be imprisoned for up to twenty years.85
Paraphernalia is also subject to seizure and forfeiture.86 Seizure
and forfeiture is not limited to paraphernalia itself; real property used
in conjunction with a Paraphernalia Control Act violation may also be
seized.87 Seizures and forfeitures occur even when a business plans to
sell or use its products only in a state with legalized marijuana, which
is of particular consequence for businesses seeking to import
paraphernalia.88 The inability to import products has serious
implications for competition among industry participants; for some
businesses seizure may cause irreparable harm and threaten
dissolution.89

83. See, e.g., Dyer, 750 F. Supp. at 1298–99 (holding that a retailer or manufacturer may be
charged for each individual transaction involving paraphernalia).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a), (c)(7)(D) (2012). Those violating the Paraphernalia Control Act have
indeed been charged and convicted under the anti-money laundering laws. See, e.g., Posters ‘N’
Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994); United States v. Ways, 832 F.3d 887 (11th Cir.
2016).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a).
86. 21 U.S.C. §§ 863(c), 881(a)(7), 881(a)(10).
87. Id. § 881(a)(7) (allowing forfeiture of “[a]ll real property, including any right, title, and
interest (including any leasehold interest) . . . which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner
or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of” the CSA). What constitutes
“commission” is broad. For instance, storage of paraphernalia on real property is sufficient to
establish that the property was used in the commission of a crime. See United States v. Real
Property Located at 25445 Via Dona Christa, 138 F.3d 403, 407–08 (9th Cir. 1998). Forfeiture may
also be utilized to satisfy fines imposed on businesses for Paraphernalia Control Act violations.
See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1245–46 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (forfeiture
of property worth $2.5 million to satisfy fines).
88. See, e.g., CannaCloud Vaporizer, CBP Ruling Letter, HQ H275206 (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://rulings.cbp.gov/ruling/H275206 [https://perma.cc/YL9D-EJF6] (ruling letter rejecting the
importation of a single-use, pod-based cannabis vaporizing system to be sold in Colorado because
the product constituted “drug paraphernalia” under the Paraphernalia Control Act). Businesses
attempting to import paraphernalia will either receive an advance ruling letter from U.S. Customs
and Border Protection that denies importation or have their goods seized by the agency upon
importation. See, e.g., Stashlogix Storage Case, CBP Ruling Letter, HQ H282163 (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://rulings.cbp.gov/ruling/H282163 [https://perma.cc/PM85-B58R] (ruling letter rejecting the
importation of childproof lock boxes for storing marijuana because the product was “drug
paraphernalia” as defined by the Paraphernalia Control Act).
89. See, e.g., CannaKorp, Inc. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1348 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2017) (rejecting the argument that seizure would inflict irreparable harm “through disruption of
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Enforcement of these penalties is not uncommon. The federal
government has targeted the paraphernalia industry on multiple
occasions. Two nationwide investigations that took place in the early
2000s—code-named “Operation Pipe Dreams” and “Operation
Headhunter”—were joint enforcement efforts by the DOJ and DEA
aimed at “eliminat[ing] the demand for illegal substances by
eliminating those products that are used to ingest and inhale illegal
substances.”90 Enforcement of the Paraphernalia Control Act was
considered a necessary step to targeting the drug trade. As then-Acting
DEA Administrator John B. Brown explained, “People selling drug
paraphernalia are in essence no different than drug dealers . . . . They
are as much a part of drug trafficking as silencers are a part of criminal
homicide.”91 The two operations ultimately resulted in the arrest of fifty
individuals, including the widely publicized arrest of actor Tommy
Chong, of Cheech and Chong fame.92 Chong was ultimately sentenced
to nine months in prison, fined, and forced to forfeit $120,000 in
assets.93
Federal enforcement has been pursued even in instances where
local enforcement agencies have permitted the prohibited conduct. For
example, following a 2005 operation by the DEA that targeted
paraphernalia retailers in Montana, a Missoula retailer who had
operated a paraphernalia shop without opposition from local or state
government officials for eight years was indicted and found guilty under
the Paraphernalia Control Act.94 Prior to opening his paraphernalia

supplier relationships, lost business opportunities, and reputational harm . . . threaten[ing] the
complete failure of CannaKorp’s business”).
90. Jacob Sullum, Bongs Away!, REASON (Feb. 2009), https://reason.com/archives/2009/01/
16/bongs-away [https://perma.cc/LU9X-C98E] (quoting U.S. Attorney Mary Beth Buchanan of the
Western District of Pennsylvania, who spearheaded the investigation).
91. Press Release, Drug Enf’t Admin., Operations Pipe Dreams and Headhunter Put Illegal
Drug Paraphernalia Sellers Out of Business (Feb. 24, 2003), https://www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/
pr022403.html [https://perma.cc/86DC-8Z42].
92. Id. (detailing enforcement efforts); see also Thomas Regnier, “Civilizing” Drug
Paraphernalia Policy: Preserving Our Free Speech and Due Process Rights While Protecting
Children, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 149–50 (2011) (detailing Tommy Chong’s arrest
and imprisonment).
93. Sullum, supra note 90. Chong pled guilty to the Paraphernalia Control Act charges after
prosecutors threatened to charge his wife and son as well, because they had cosigned a loan for
Chong’s business. Id. The severity of the sentence may have been due to Assistant U.S. Attorney
Mary Houghton’s request that the judge impose a harsh term: “[T]he defendant has become
wealthy throughout his entertainment career through glamorizing the illegal distribution and use
of marijuana. Feature films that he made with his longtime partner Cheech Marin, such as ‘Up in
Smoke,’ trivialize law enforcement efforts to combat drug trafficking and use.” Id.
94. See Tristan Scott, Pipe Shop Owner Given Probation, MISSOULIAN (June 3, 2006),
https://www.missoulian.com/news/local/pipe-shop-owner-given-probation/article_10664266-fa41-5
257-95a0-bc5b982f49e6.html [https://perma.cc/QBH3-8BT7] (explaining that the retailer
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shop, the retailer sought clarification from his local prosecutor’s office
that the venture was legal, and the office explicitly affirmed that it
was.95 The prosecutor to whom the retailer spoke even served as a
defense witness at his trial.96 Despite receiving permission from local
authorities, the retailer’s conduct was not considered “authorized.” The
U.S. district attorney trying the case successfully argued that
permission from a local prosecutor was inadequate to authorize the
retailer’s conduct under federal law, and the retailer was ultimately
convicted of violating the Paraphernalia Control Act and sentenced to
house arrest.97
These operations illustrate the need for a better understanding
of how to interpret the term “authorized.” The Missoula retailer
discussed above had sought and received explicit, verbal permission
from local government officials to engage in otherwise prohibited
conduct, but was found guilty of violating the Paraphernalia Control
Act nonetheless. While the retailer received house arrest, Tommy
Chong’s case illustrates that those violating the Act are not spared from
the significant penalties that can attach. Federal efforts targeting
paraphernalia have not disappeared since the large-scale operations of
the early 2000s. In 2016, for example, the DEA raided and seized
paraphernalia from a business operating in New Mexico, where medical
marijuana is legal.98 Even if the federal government chooses to forego
enforcement of the Paraphernalia Control Act, other consequences
attach by virtue of paraphernalia’s federally unlawful status, as
explored in the next Section.

“operated [his paraphernalia shop] in Missoula for eight years, without subterfuge and without
legal consequences”).
95. See Sullum, supra note 90 (“[E]ven though [the paraphernalia shop] sold unconventional
pipes of the sort commonly used to smoke marijuana, the local prosecutor’s office had told [the
retailer] his business was legal.”).
96. See Scott, supra note 94 (“Deputy County Attorney Mike Sehestedt even testified that
before [the retailer] opened his shop, [he] made a point to visit the county attorney’s office and
make certain his business was within legal boundaries. And the law gave [him] a green light.”);
Sullum, supra note 90 (“At his trial in February 2006, [the retailer] was able to bring as a witness
for the defense Missoula County Chief Deputy County Attorney Mike Sehestedt, who said he did
not consider [the paraphernalia shop’s] merchandise to be drug paraphernalia . . . .”).
97. Sullum, supra note 90.
98. United States v. Assorted Drug Paraphernalia, No. CIV 16-1310 KBM/CG, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 171032, at *1–2 (D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2018) (describing a 2016 raid by the DEA on a
paraphernalia shop in New Mexico); see Lynn and Erin Compassionate Use Act, ch. 210, 2007 N.M.
Laws 2833 (codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2B-1 to -7 (2018)) (legalizing medical
marijuana in New Mexico). The 2016 raid was not an isolated occurrence. See, e.g., United States
v. Assorted Drug Paraphernalia, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1224 (D.N.M. 2015) (describing the DEA’s
seizure of marijuana paraphernalia from an inventory storage unit in New Mexico in 2012).
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2. Unenumerated Consequences
Marijuana paraphernalia businesses, even those operating only
in states with legal marijuana, face serious hurdles and are denied
many federal privileges by virtue of the goods they deal. In addition to
the penalties plainly enumerated in the Paraphernalia Control Act, a
number of adverse consequences attach as a result of marijuana
paraphernalia’s federally unlawful status. This Section explores three
chief consequences: the inability to register trademarks for use on
paraphernalia or depicting paraphernalia, the barriers faced by
industry participants in securing banking services, and the difficulty of
enforcing otherwise valid contracts in federal court.
The adverse consequences highlighted in this Section are not the
only consequences that arise from paraphernalia’s unlawful status. For
example, industry participants face onerous tax burdens, including the
inability to deduct business expenses—rent, insurance, salaries, etc.—
from their taxes, which greatly impacts a business’s profits and overall
sustainability.99 Industry participants are also unable to benefit from
bankruptcy protection since they are not entitled to equitable relief
under the doctrine of unclean hands.100 And significantly, many
paraphernalia businesses find it difficult to obtain legal
representation.101 These and many other consequences that attach to
paraphernalia’s unlawful status detrimentally impact marijuana
paraphernalia businesses in ways not reflected in the text of the
Paraphernalia Control Act.
a. Trademark Registration
While registration of trademarks relating to or for use on drug
paraphernalia is not plainly prohibited by federal trademark laws, such
a prohibition has been read into the law’s text. The Lanham Act, which
governs trademarks, permits registration of “trademark[s] used in
commerce.”102 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has
99. 26 U.S.C. § 280E (2012) (“No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or
incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business (or the activities which
comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled substances . . . which is
prohibited by Federal [or State] law . . . .”); see Sam Kamin & Viva R. Moffat, Trademark
Laundering, Useless Patents, and Other IP Challenges for the Marijuana Industry, 73 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 217, 235–36 (2016) (explaining that marijuana businesses must pay taxes on “illgotten income” and discussing the “devastating effect” this requirement has on businesses).
100. See Kamin & Moffat, supra note 99, at 234–35 (discussing marijuana businesses’ inability
to obtain bankruptcy protections).
101. See id. at 236–40 (highlighting various reasons that lawyers are deterred from
representing marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia businesses).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
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interpreted this general wording to require lawful use in commerce. The
USPTO’s Trademark Manual of Examining Procedures provides that
“[u]se of a mark in commerce must be lawful use to be the basis for
federal registration of the mark.”103
While lawful use in commerce is generally presumed, the
manual explicitly contemplates paraphernalia-related activity as a
basis for refusing registration.104 This is true regardless of whether a
paraphernalia business operates in a state with legalized marijuana.105
And because the Paraphernalia Control Act broadly defines
“paraphernalia,” the picks and shovels of the industry, although not
inherently unlawful, are unregistrable.106 Under the trademark
manual’s guidance, examiners have relied on the Paraphernalia
Control Act to reject numerous trademarks for use on marijuana
103. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 907 (Oct. 2018); see also, e.g., In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 48, 51 (T.T.A.B. 1968):
It is true, as applicant urges, that there is no reference to “lawful commerce” in Section 1
of the trademark statute . . . . It seems evident that the term “commerce” whenever and
wherever used in the trademark statute must necessarily refer to “lawful commerce”;
and that the statute was not intended to recognize under its registration provisions
shipments in commerce in contravention of other regulatory acts promulgated under
the “commerce clause” of the Constitution.
104. TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 103, § 907 (“Generally, the
USPTO presumes that an applicant’s use of the mark in commerce is lawful . . . unless the record
or other evidence shows a clear violation of law, such as the sale or transportation of a controlled
substance.”); see id. (noting that it is unlawful under the CSA to “sell, offer for sale, or use any
facility of interstate commerce to transport drug paraphernalia”).
This has not always been the case. In 2010, the USPTO permitted registration of marijuanarelated marks, but it reversed course shortly thereafter and declared that registration of such
marks was “highly unlikely” in the future. Rebeccah Gan, Intellectual Property Law: Protection for
Marijuana Trademarks, AM. BAR ASS’N (June 29, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2015/november-december/intellectual_property_law_protection_marij
uana_trademarks [https://perma.cc/A3U6-GJNW]. After reversing course, the USPTO adopted
guidelines for paraphernalia-related marks that are stricter than those for marks related to the
substance itself. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 907 (Jan. 2017).
105. TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 103, § 907 (“Regardless of
state law, the federal law provides no exception to the above-referenced provisions for marijuana
for ‘medical use.’ ”).
106. See, e.g., In re Ultra Trimmer, L.L.C., No. 86479070, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 563, at *5–6
(T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2016) (noting that the applicant’s marijuana trimming machine “is a product
that is not unlawful as it is described in the identification of goods in the application” but instead
only becomes unlawful once it is determined that the item is intended for use with a controlled
substance). For an explanation of how trademark examiners determine whether an item is
unlawful paraphernalia, see supra Section I.B.2. Notably, this determination is not limited to an
applicant’s submitted materials; trademark examiners also use external evidence, such as the
applicant’s website or advertising materials, to decide a product’s legality. See e.g., In re Ultra
Trimmer, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 563, at *5–9 (relying on the applicant’s website to determine that the
product to which a mark would be affixed met the definition of paraphernalia); In re Brown, 119
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350, 1350–51, 1353 (T.T.A.B. 2016) (relying on the applicant’s website and
photos of potential retail storefronts to determine that a mark was intended for use on unlawful
paraphernalia and thus unregistrable).
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paraphernalia, and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has
affirmed these rejections.107
The inability to register federal trademarks puts marijuana
paraphernalia businesses at a disadvantage and harms consumers as
well.108 Trademarks serve an important “source identification” function
in that they enable consumers to distinguish between producers of
competing products.109 A product’s source signals to the consumer
information related to a product’s “attributes and quality.”110 By
identifying the product’s source, a trademark reduces consumer search
costs and ensures that consumers receive products of consistent
quality.111 Trademark registration also avoids deception in the market
by ensuring that products are not speciously similar, which further
lowers consumer search costs.112 The signaling effect of a product’s
source and quality, in turn, “secur[es] to the producer the benefits of
good reputation.”113 A trademark gains its value from the reputation
and goodwill that the product itself creates.114 Without proper source
attribution, reputation cannot be generated,115 and without reputation,

107. See, e.g., In re Ultra Trimmer, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 563, at *1, *5 (affirming refusal to
register the mark “Ultra Trimmer” for “agricultural machines” intended for trimming “leaves,
plants, flowers and buds”); In re JJ206, LLC, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1568, 1568–70 (T.T.A.B. 2016)
(affirming refusal to register “Juju Joints” and “Powered by Juju” for use on a “smokeless cannabis
vaporizing apparatus”); In re Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350–51, 1353 (affirming refusal to
register “Herbal Access” for “retail store services featuring herbs”); see also In re Ultra Trimmer,
2016 TTAB LEXIS 563, at *5–7 (“[T]here is no doubt that [the Paraphernalia Control Act] is the
statutory basis for the Examining Attorney’s conclusion that Applicant’s goods are unlawful under
federal law.”).
108. See Kamin & Moffat, supra note 99, at 241–59 (discussing disadvantages).
109. See Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (“The Lanham
Act provides national protection of trademarks in order to . . . protect the ability of consumers to
distinguish among competing producers.”); Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 509 F.3d
380, 381 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Trademarks are designed to inform potential buyers who makes the
goods on sale.”).
110. Top Tobacco, 509 F.3d at 381.
111. Mana Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., Inc., 65 F.3d 1063, 1068 (2d Cir. 1995).
112. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (explaining
that by “preventing competitors from copying ‘a source-identifying mark,’ ” a trademark “reduces
the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions” (quoting Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995))).
113. Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198; see also Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers
Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194–95 (1936) (explaining that “[g]ood will is a valuable contributing aid to
business—sometimes the most valuable contributing asset of the producer or distributor of
commodities”).
114. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (explaining that trademark registration “helps assure a
producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related
rewards associated with a desirable product” (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163–64)); Mana Prods.,
65 F.3d at 1068 (“Congress believed that protecting trademarks . . . secures to trademark owners
their reputation and goodwill.”).
115. Top Tobacco, 509 F.3d at 381.
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competition suffers.116 Reputational gains incentivize producers to
invest in product quality to distinguish themselves from competitors in
the market, which benefits society as a whole by increasing the quality
of available products and forcing low-quality producers out of the
market. Trademarks, then, benefit producers by providing goodwill
gained from their products’ quality and in turn foster competition.117
While state trademark protection may be available for marks
related to marijuana paraphernalia, this protection provides only a
partial remedy to the inability to obtain federal registration. The most
obvious shortcoming is that state trademark protection is
geographically limited.118 Full trademark protection for marijuana
paraphernalia businesses requires registration in each state in which
the business operates. Navigating the laws of multiple states is not only
administratively difficult but financially burdensome as well.119
Further, should a business find that its mark is being used in a state in
which the business is not registered, the business has no redress under
federal law.120
A solution to the consumer and producer harms that result from
the inability to register federal trademarks is to authorize otherwise
prohibited conduct using the Paraphernalia Control Act’s authorization
exemption. Stripping paraphernalia of its federally unlawful status
offers procompetitive effects for the marijuana paraphernalia market:
it reduces consumer search costs, promotes competition through
increased reputational gains, and increases the overall quality of
products on the market as a result of increased competition. By
authorizing conduct under the Paraphernalia Control Act, a state can
avoid the federal law’s negative impact on businesses, consumers, and
competition.
b. Banking
Because banks are subject to federal laws, these institutions
largely refuse banking services to marijuana and marijuana
paraphernalia businesses.121 Federal law places stringent requirements
116. Id. (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166–209 (2003)).
117. Mana Prods., 65 F.3d at 1068.
118. See Kamin & Moffat, supra note 99, at 257 (“State trademark rights protect businesses
only within that state and for marijuana businesses in particular, other states’ courts may not be
friendly fora.”).
119. See Kamin & Moffat, supra note 99, at 258–59.
120. See id. at 259.
121. This is true regardless of whether a financial institution is incorporated under state or
federal charter or as a credit union. See Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism,
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on financial institutions that make banking with marijuana-industry
participants unappealing. First, these institutions may be prosecuted
for aiding and abetting prohibited conduct, which can occur by, for
example, knowingly providing a loan to a marijuana paraphernalia
business.122 Further, federal anti-money laundering laws require
financial institutions to implement systems for preventing enterprises
engaged in federally unlawful activities from entering the banking
system.123 These institutions are also required to discover illegal
activities conducted by existing customers and to report any suspicious
activity that may be discovered.124 Should financial institutions
discover a marijuana paraphernalia enterprise’s unlawful activity and
not respond appropriately, the financial institution will be subject to
criminal liability or monetary sanctions under the Money Laundering
Control Act.125 These requirements and potential liabilities give the
banking industry good reason to avoid any interactions with marijuana
and marijuana paraphernalia businesses.126
These burdensome requirements prevent industry participants
from receiving loans from financial institutions, instead forcing them to
rely on short-term loans from individuals, and necessitate using only

65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 598, 604–06, 617–18 (2015) (explaining that federally backed insurance
is largely responsible for federal control over state-chartered financial institutions and credit
unions).
122. Id. at 607–10.
123. Federal law requires all banks, credit unions, and various other entities to maintain antimoney laundering programs that consist of internal controls and corresponding procedures, a
specified compliance officer, ongoing employee training, and independent audits intended to test
these programs. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1) (2012) (mandating minimum standards for anti-money
laundering programs); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended throughout the U.S. Code) (requiring detailed recordkeeping
and reporting procedures); Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118 (1970) (same); see
also 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (2012) (broadly defining a “financial institution” subject to federal antimoney laundering requirements).
124. See Hill, supra note 121, at 612–15 & nn.73–76 (discussing the due diligence
requirements that federal law imposes on financial institutions and the reports that must be filed
should an institution identify suspicious activity).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012); see Hill, supra note 121, at 610–11 (detailing the ways in which
financial institutions can be found liable for money laundering when interacting with marijuanarelated businesses); id. at 618–20 (highlighting impediments to serving the marijuana industry
faced by federally backed financial institutions). Serving the marijuana industry entails
significant risk. For instance, financial institutions that violate anti-money laundering laws can
have their charters revoked. See Ernest L. Simons IV, Note, Anti-Money Laundering Compliance:
Only Mega Banks Need Apply, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 249, 259–60 (2013) (providing specific
examples of banks that have “run afoul of [anti-money laundering] laws, sometimes leading to lost
charters or their exit from the correspondent banking market”).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (2012) (listing activities prohibited by the Paraphernalia
Control Act as unlawful activities).
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cash in the ordinary course of business.127 These all-cash transactions
present an additional burden on marijuana paraphernalia businesses:
cash management. To ensure the security of their profits, businesses
must make strategic decisions on how and where to guard their cash,128
which drains valuable resources.129 While some might assume banks
are friendlier to paraphernalia businesses than they are to marijuana
cultivators and distributors, this is not the case.130 Even when the
federal government issued guidance that urged prosecutors not to
enforce the federal marijuana ban against actors in states with
legalized marijuana,131 financial institutions remained reluctant to deal
with those businesses.132 The recent rescission of that guidance133 may

127. See Hill, supra note 121, at 600–01 (“Without access to banking services, marijuana
businesses must conduct transactions in cash and spend an inordinate amount of time and
resources on cash management.”).
128. See Kristina Davis, Licensed Marijuana Businesses Operate in the Shadows Without
Access to Banks, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
business/sd-me-pot-banking-20170210-story.html [https://perma.cc/2SDS-7TVG] (quoting one
business owner as explaining, “I buried everything. I had three different safes buried on a 200acre parcel . . . Fifteen steps from the oak tree, a lot like a pirate. I had a little map. Pretty
inconvenient and not the best cash management system.”).
129. See Hill, supra note 121, at 601 (“From vaults, to cameras, to security personnel, to
finding suppliers that accept cash payment, managing cash can quickly become a logistical and
security nightmare.”); James Rufus Koren, Why Some Pot Businesses Hide Their Cash—And
Others Truck It Straight to a Federal Vault, L.A. TIMES (July 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-cannabis-banking-20170707-story.html [https://perma.cc/F22W-6PCL] (detailing a
CEO’s account that of his fifty-employee business, two employees are fully devoted to cash
management).
130. See Davis, supra note 128 (highlighting findings from a 2015 survey that forty-nine
percent of marijuana-industry enterprises not directly dealing with the substance do not have
bank accounts).
131. In 2013, the federal government issued guidance on enforcement of marijuana-related
conduct that evinced a strong deference to state law. See Memorandum from James M. Cole,
Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ2B6R63]. The guidance explained that “[i]n jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana
in some form and that have also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement
systems . . . conduct in compliance with those laws and regulations is less likely to
threaten . . . federal priorities.” Id. at 3. When states have implemented enforcement systems,
“consistent with the traditional allocation of federal-state efforts in this area, enforcement of state
law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means
of addressing marijuana-related activity.” Id.
132. See Alicia Wallace, What Now? Experts and Politicians Weigh In on Potential Impact of
Sessions’ Rollback of Marijuana Policy, CANNABIST (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.thecannabist.co/
2018/01/04/sessions-cole-memo-marijuana-legal-impact/95903 [https://perma.cc/9VXK-LJ45].
133. In early 2018, the Trump administration rescinded the nonenforcement guidance and
clarified its view that federal marijuana laws should take precedence over state marijuana laws.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Issues Memo on Marijuana Enforcement (Jan.
4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memo-marijuana-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/843V-RN5G] (“It is the mission of the Department of Justice to enforce the laws
of the United States, and the previous issuance of guidance undermines the rule of law and the
ability of our local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement partners to carry out this mission.”).
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intensify banks’ reluctance to transact with marijuana and marijuana
paraphernalia businesses.134
Marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia businesses are not the
only parties affected by their inability to bank; states are harmed as
well. Under the current federal anti-money laundering laws, cash-only
businesses have both an incentive and an opportunity to evade taxes.
States’ inability to collect taxes from marijuana and marijuana
paraphernalia businesses makes it more difficult to fund regulatory
structures for the marijuana industry.135 Thus, in addition to protecting
in-state marijuana paraphernalia businesses from the inability to
safely manage their assets, states themselves would benefit from
authorizing activities otherwise prohibited by the Paraphernalia
Control Act.
c. Contract Enforcement
The federal marijuana prohibition hinders the ability of
marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia businesses to engage in a
routine and necessary feature of all industries: contract enforcement.
The certainty provided by judicial enforcement of contracts is essential
to any industry and of particular importance for the marijuana
industry.136 Without contractual protections, industry participants may
be forced into a “world of illegal businesses” despite operating in a state
where their business is legal.137 The unlawful federal status of
marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia, however, has prompted many
courts to hold marijuana-related contracts unenforceable.138
134. See Robert A. Mikos, Jeff Sessions Rescinds Obama-Era Enforcement Guidance:
Five Observations, VAND. U. (Jan. 5, 2018), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/01/
jeff-sessions-rescinds-obama-era-enforcement-guidance-six-observations [https://perma.cc/LFE3DS6W] (explaining that rescission of the nonenforcement guidance “will likely make it even more
difficult for the industry to obtain banking services”); Wallace, supra note 132 (taking account of
Professor Robert Mikos’s view that without the assurances previously provided by the Cole
Memorandum, “banks are going to become even more reluctant to deal with marijuana suppliers”).
135. Hill, supra note 121, at 602–03; see Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax
Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37 (2009) (discussing incentives of cash-only businesses to
underreport their taxes).
136. See Luke Scheuer, Are “Legal” Marijuana Contracts “Illegal”?, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J.
31, 44–45 (2015) (highlighting the importance of contracts for the marijuana industry).
137. Id. at 53 (explaining that where courts cannot create a remedy for industry participants,
violence and threats may serve as the primary enforcement mechanism).
138. See Sam Kamin, The Limits of Marijuana Legalization in the States, 99 IOWA L. REV.
BULL. 39, 46 (2014) (“When a business’s every transaction violates federal law, however, the
certainty that contract law is supposed to provide is necessarily called into question.”). For the
marijuana paraphernalia industry, these contracts include, for instance, contracts for the sale of
marijuana paraphernalia, contracts for funding marijuana paraphernalia enterprises, contracts
for services rendered in relation to marijuana paraphernalia activities, lease agreements, and
insurance claims.
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Courts invalidate marijuana-related contracts under the
doctrine of unclean hands,139 whereby contracts are deemed invalid and
unenforceable for violating public policy.140 The doctrine is grounded in
the requirement that plaintiffs must “have acted fairly and without
fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue.”141 When a contract is
determined to be unenforceable under the doctrine of unclean hands, no
legal remedy is available to the parties for an alleged contractual
breach.142
While contracts related to the marijuana industry are frequently
deemed unenforceable because they relate to “unlawful” products,
decisionmakers possess discretion in making this determination after
balancing the relevant interests at stake.143 Specifically, the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts directs judges to balance the public
policy interests in favor of contract enforcement with the policy
interests against it.144 Many courts, however, fail to balance the
relevant interests and instead simply conclude that marijuana-related
contracts are unenforceable because they are “illegal” under the CSA.145
139. See generally Steven Mare, Note, He Who Comes into Court Must Not Come with Green
Hands: The Marijuana Industry’s Ongoing Struggle with the Illegality and Unclean Hands
Doctrines, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1351, 1359–62 (2016) (reviewing history and application of the
unclean hands doctrine).
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A promise or
other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that
it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by
a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.”). Put simply, this doctrine is based on the
idea that “[a] plaintiff asking a court for equitable relief ‘must come with clean hands.’ ” Northbay
Wellness Grp., Inc. v. Beyries, 789 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson v. Yellow Cab
Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387 (1944)).
141. Northbay Wellness Grp., 789 F.3d at 959 (quoting Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d
1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985)).
142. See Scheuer, supra note 136, at 45 (“Both the U.C.C. and the common law offer remedies
that will not be available if a court refuses to enforce contracts . . . .”).
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178; see Kamin, supra note 138, at 46
(discussing prevalence of such decisions); Scheuer, supra note 136, at 46, 49–51 (detailing the
balancing test for finding a contract unenforceable under the unclean hands doctrine).
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178. The Restatement provides factors to
weigh in conducting the balancing test. In evaluating the interests in favor of enforcement, courts
are instructed to consider “(a) the parties’ justified expectations, (b) any forfeiture that would
result if enforcement were denied, and (c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the
particular term.” Id. § 178(2). The interests to consider in weighing the public policy against
enforcement include “(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial
decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy, (c) the
seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was deliberate, and (d) the
directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term.” Id. § 178(3).
145. See Scheuer, supra note 136, at 46 (criticizing courts for “void[ing] ‘illegal’ agreements
without weighing any competing public policies”); see also, e.g., Barrios v. County of Tulare, No.
1:13-CV-1665 AWI GSA, 2014 WL 2174746, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (“Although California
may provide Barrios with the right to possess medical marijuana, federal law does not.”); Tracy v.
USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-00487 LEK-KSC, 2012 WL 928186, at *13 (D. Haw. Mar. 16, 2012)
(“[T]his Court cannot enforce the [contractual] provision because Plaintiff’s possession and
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This failure to engage in a full balancing test may be a result of the
Restatement’s inclusion of relevant legislation as an explicit basis for
finding an interest against enforcement.146 But while legislation is a
factor to consider, the Restatement clarifies that “it is not necessarily
conclusive.”147 Instead, decisionmakers should “examine the particular
statute in the light of the whole legislative scheme.”148 Examining the
Paraphernalia Control Act in light of the entire CSA indicates a choice
by Congress not to occupy the entire field,149 which should lessen any
potential policy interests against enforcement.150
Some courts have adhered to the Restatement’s balancing test
and found marijuana-related contracts enforceable despite the
substance’s illegality. In Northbay Wellness Group, Inc. v. Beyries, for
instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a
lower court decision that prohibited a marijuana business from
recovering funds embezzled by the business’s attorney.151 In examining
the lower court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit noted that it had “failed to
conduct the required balancing, instead concluding solely from the fact
that Northbay had engaged in wrongful activity that the doctrine of

cultivation of marijuana, even for State-authorized medical use, clearly violates federal law,” and
enforcing the contract “would be contrary to federal law and public policy, as reflected in the CSA,
Gonzales, and its progeny.”); Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, Nos. CV2011-051310, CV2011051311, 2012 WL 12874349, at *2 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012) (holding a loan agreement
between an investor and a medical marijuana dispensary “void as against public policy” because
the formation of the contract was unlawful); Bovard v. Am. Horse Enters., Inc., 247 Cal. Rptr. 340,
341 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming decision that a paraphernalia business’s contract “was illegal and
void as contrary to public policy”); Haeberle v. Lowden, No. 2011CV709, 2012 WL 7149098, at *2
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 2012) (“[U]nder the law’s current state, the sale and use of marijuana, even
for medical purposes, remains against the public policy of the United States. . . . Accordingly, the
contract here is void and unenforceable.”).
While the Restatement does provide that unenforceability may be “plain” in some “grave”
cases, it also clarifies that “[i]n doubtful cases . . . a decision as to enforceability is reached only
after a careful balancing, in the light of all the circumstances, of the interest[s] . . . .” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. a. Conflicting state and federal laws should be understood as
“doubtful cases,” and for marijuana paraphernalia, the cooperative federalism model created by
the Paraphernalia Control Act’s authorization exemption should warrant a careful balancing of
the interests at stake.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179.
147. Id. § 179 cmt. b (“The fact that the statute explicitly prohibits the making of a promise or
the engaging in the promised conduct may be persuasive in showing a policy against enforcement
of a promise but it is not necessarily conclusive.”).
148. Id.
149. Congress explicitly renounced occupation of the entire field of controlled substance
regulation in a reverse preemption clause. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). For analyses on the issue of
preemption of state marijuana laws by federal law, see, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky et al.,
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015); and Robert A.
Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5 (2013).
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. b.
151. 789 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2015).
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unclean hands applied.”152 The required balancing revealed that the
public policy interest in enforcing the contract far outweighed any
interest against enforcement.153 The Ninth Circuit concluded that “the
clean hands doctrine should not be strictly enforced when to do so would
frustrate a substantial public interest.”154
Some states, mindful of courts’ tendency to decide against
enforcement of marijuana-related contracts, have enacted statutes
clarifying how these contracts should be treated. Colorado, for instance,
enacted a statute providing that “[i]t is the public policy of the state of
Colorado that a contract is not void or voidable as against public policy
if it pertains to lawful activities authorized by [the state’s marijuana
laws].”155 The Colorado provision appears to thus far have served as an
effective step in ensuring at least some marijuana contracts are
enforced: in Green Earth Wellness Center, LLC v. Atain Specialty
Insurance Co., the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
declined to follow other cases that had “concluded that the
[CSA] . . . prevailed over state law” in the context of a contract
dispute.156 But the risk of a contrary decision is substantial. The
Colorado Supreme Court has read the state’s contract protection statute
narrowly, holding in one case that “an activity such as medical
marijuana use that is unlawful under federal law is not a ‘lawful’
activity.”157 Because nothing in the state’s contract protection statute
indicates that contracts “pertain[ing] to lawful activities” must be read
to mean contracts that are “lawful under Colorado law,” the court
refused to enforce the contract at issue.158 Oregon has enacted a
provision similar to Colorado’s, but it is more explicit in its wording: “A
contract is not unenforceable on the basis that manufacturing,
distributing, dispensing, possessing or using marijuana is prohibited by
federal law.”159 No court has had occasion to interpret the Oregon
provision. Notably, while Oregon’s law is more explicit than Colorado’s,
it limits its protections to contracts related to marijuana, meaning that
decisionmakers may decide the statute does not cover contracts related
to marijuana paraphernalia.
152. Id. at 960.
153. Id. at 960–61 (reasoning that “[a] lawyer’s ‘[m]isappropriation of a client’s property is a
gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession
and therefore merits severe punishment’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting Greenbaum v.
State Bar, 544 P.2d 921, 928 (Cal. 1976))).
154. Id. at 960 (quoting EEOC v. Recruit U.S.A., Inc., 939 F.2d 746, 753 (9th Cir. 1991)).
155. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-601 (2018).
156. 163 F. Supp. 3d 821, 835 (D. Colo. 2016).
157. Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849, 851–53 (Colo. 2015).
158. Id.
159. OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.535 (2017).
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The availability of contract enforcement through the courts in
states that have legalized marijuana is thus uncertain. While state
statutes evincing a legislative intent to enforce marijuana-related
contracts may prove a reliable solution, the available case law does not
imbue total confidence. While not all encompassing, the Paraphernalia
Control Act’s authorization exemption may serve as a means of
protecting marijuana paraphernalia businesses from consequences that
attach to paraphernalia’s unlawful status. By employing the
authorization exemption, a state may “turn off” paraphernalia’s
federally unlawful status, thereby lessening the public policy interests
against enforcing contracts involving marijuana paraphernalia. With
their conduct authorized by state law, paraphernalia businesses would
be able to enter into routine contracts with increased confidence that
those contracts would later be protected.
II. THE AUTHORIZATION CONTINUUM
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, several adverse
consequences can result from violations of the federal paraphernalia
prohibition. The Paraphernalia Control Act’s authorization exemption,
however, offers a mechanism for states to protect industry participants
from these effects. The Act exempts from its prohibition “any person
authorized by local, State, or Federal law to manufacture, possess, or
distribute [paraphernalia].”160 Taking advantage of this exemption
requires an understanding of what it means to “authorize” conduct.
Because the term “authorized” does not have a clear, inherent meaning,
there is little consensus on how it should be interpreted and what
actions should be considered authorization by law.
But the significance that attaches to a party’s status as a person
“authorized” to engage in otherwise prohibited conduct warrants a
fuller understanding of the term. This significance is not limited to the
Paraphernalia Control Act. Usage of the term spans diverse areas of
law. The aim of this Note is to provide a more comprehensive and
nuanced understanding of the term “authorized” as it is used across the
law by analyzing it in the context of the Paraphernalia Control Act.
Rather than possessing one intuitive meaning, the term
“authorized” should be understood as existing along a continuum of
possible meanings. The plain meaning of the word as evinced by
dictionary definitions points in divergent directions: On one hand,

160. 21 U.S.C. § 863(f)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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authorization might simply mean to “permit a thing to be done.”161
Under this definition, authorization is inherent, and inaction—that is,
a lack of prohibition or regulation—is sufficient to authorize conduct.
As explained by one court, this form of authorization follows from the
logic that “if something is explicitly not prohibited, it is permitted.”162
On the other hand, authorization may connote a more affirmative form
of permission; it may involve taking a positive action to make a thing
legally valid.163 Under this conception, authorization requires an official
“sanction[ing]” or “endorse[ment].”164 This definition is undoubtedly
how most would understand the term at first blush.165 But as Chief
Justice Rehnquist once explained, limiting interpretation of the term
“authorized” to such a narrow conception risks “mak[ing] a fortress out
of the dictionary” by ignoring that the dictionary includes both broad
and limited definitions of the term.166 This restrictive interpretation of
authorization is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent
pronouncement in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
that authorizing conduct does not require affirmative sanctioning.167
Between the narrow, affirmative conception of authorization and the
broad, inherent conception of authorization lie more implied forms. The
universe of possible implied authorizations creates a continuum that
stretches from authorization through affirmative action to
authorization through inaction.
Thus inheres the authorization continuum. While all forms
existing along the continuum can be conceived of as “authorization,” the
effectiveness of these forms gradually decreases (or increases) as one
161. Authorize, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); Authorize, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(4th ed. 1968); Authorize, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993); Authorize,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authorize (last updated Mar. 1,
2019) [https://perma.cc/4ZJH-WPE7] [hereinafter Authorize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER]; see also County
of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 198 n.10 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing
definitions).
162. Mich. Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 918 N.W.2d 756, 784 (Mich. 2018).
163. Authorization, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2014) (defining “authorization” as
“formal permission or approval” and “the action of making [something] legally valid”).
164. Authorization, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “authorization” as
“[o]fficial permission to do something; sanction or warrant” and “[t]he official document granting
such permission”); Authorize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 161 (defining “authorization” as “to
endorse, empower, justify, or permit by or as if by some recognized or proper authority (such as
custom, evidence, personal right, or regulating power)” and “to invest especially with legal
authority”).
165. See, e.g., Gunther, 452 U.S. at 169 (“Although the word ‘authorize’ sometimes means
simply ‘to permit,’ it ordinarily denotes affirmative enabling action.” (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979))).
166. Id. at 198 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739
(2d Cir.), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)).
167. 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1474 (2018) (holding that repeal of a prohibition constitutes authorization
by law); see infra Section II.C.1 (discussing Murphy).
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slides from one edge of the continuum to the other, as will be explored
further in Part III. This Part begins by first presenting the outer edges
of the continuum and then proceeds to discuss the possible meanings
that lie between them.
A. Affirmative Authorization
Affirmative authorization occurs when deliberate action is taken
to formally approve conduct. This interpretation of authorization is
uncontroversial, and some consider it the term’s “ordinary” meaning.168
This Section discusses two principal forms of affirmative authorization:
statutory authorization and authorization via licensure.
1. Affirmative Authorization via Statute
Statutory authorization is fairly straightforward: it involves a
legislature enacting a statute that authorizes certain conduct. This is
the most explicit form that authorization may take, although statutes
may authorize conduct using different language and by employing
different features, some of which may be more straightforward than
others.
California’s marijuana paraphernalia law provides an exemplar
of affirmative authorization. When crafting legislation to legalize
marijuana for recreational purposes, policymakers included language
specifically designed to address the Paraphernalia Control Act.169
California’s law includes a number of features that ensure
authorization is unambiguous. First, it makes it “lawful” to possess,
transport, purchase, procure, use, manufacture, and give away
marijuana “accessories” to persons over twenty-one years of age.170
Next, it defines marijuana “accessories” to closely follow the federal
definition of paraphernalia.171 Together, these two provisions are
168. See, e.g., Gunther, 452 U.S. at 169 (determining that “the word ‘authorize’ . . . ordinarily
denotes affirmative enabling action”).
169. Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act, 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1 (West)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE, CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, CAL. LAB. CODE, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE, and CAL. WATER CODE).
170. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1(a)(5) (West 2019) (“[I]t shall be lawful under
state and local law . . . for persons 21 years of age or older to . . . [p]ossess, transport, purchase,
obtain, use, manufacture, or give away cannabis accessories to persons 21 years of age or older
without any compensation whatsoever.”).
171. See id. § 11018.2:
“Cannabis accessories” means any equipment, products or materials of any kind which
are used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating,
growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing,
preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, smoking, vaporizing, or
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arguably sufficient on their own to affirmatively authorize conduct
otherwise prohibited by the Paraphernalia Control Act: California’s law
formally deems federally prohibited paraphernalia activities “lawful,”
effectively shutting off the Paraphernalia Control Act’s attaching
consequences, and while the state law uses the term “accessories”
rather than “paraphernalia,” it clarifies through its definition that
these items are the same as those prohibited by federal law. But
California’s paraphernalia law goes one step further by detailing its
express intent to authorize conduct otherwise prohibited by the
Paraphernalia Control Act. The statute clarifies that by making
paraphernalia-related activities lawful, it “intend[s] to meet the
requirements of subsection (f) of Section 863 of Title 21 of the United
States Code (21 U.S.C. Sec. 863(f))”—the Paraphernalia Control Act’s
authorization exemption—“by authorizing, under state law, any person
in compliance with this section to manufacture, possess, or distribute
cannabis accessories.”172
California’s explicit statutory mandate represents the most
affirmative means of authorization. Not only does it unequivocally
deem the otherwise unlawful activity “lawful,”173 it also utilizes
language from the Paraphernalia Control Act (“authorizing, under state
law”), directly references the federal authorization exemption
(“subsection (f) of Section 863 of Title 21 of the United States Code”),
and, most importantly, codifies a clear intention to authorize prohibited
conduct (“[the state law] is intended to meet the requirements of [the
Paraphernalia Control Act’s authorization exemption]”).174 By codifying
this intent, the legislature transforms it into written law, which a court
must then address when determining whether a litigant is
“authorized.”175 And because this law is free from ambiguity, courts
containing cannabis, or for ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing cannabis or
cannabis products into the human body.;
see also 21 U.S.C. § 863(d) (2012) (“The term ‘drug paraphernalia’ means any equipment, product,
or material of any kind which is primarily intended or designed for use in manufacturing,
compounding, converting, concealing, producing, processing, preparing, injecting, ingesting,
inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance, possession of which
is unlawful . . . .”).
172. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1(b). California’s paraphernalia law further makes
clear that paraphernalia should not be subject to certain penalties imposed by the Paraphernalia
Control Act, stating that items deemed “lawful” by the provision “are not contraband nor subject
to seizure, and no conduct deemed lawful by this [provision] shall constitute the basis for detention,
search, or arrest.” Id. § 11362.1(c).
173. Id. § 11362.1(a)(5).
174. Id. § 11362.1(b).
175. See J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION INCLUDING A
DISCUSSION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS, CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE FORMS OF
LEGISLATION AND TO LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 310 (1891) (“A legislative intention to be efficient
as law must be set forth in a statute; it is therefore a written law.”).
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are—theoretically, at least—bound to effectuate that intent given the
cooperative federalism approach codified in the Paraphernalia Control
Act.176 Thus, California’s paraphernalia law is crafted in a manner that
nearly ensures any litigant in violation of the federal paraphernalia ban
will be found “authorized by local, State, or Federal law” to engage in
otherwise prohibited activities.177
While California’s law employs a number of features that
indicate federally prohibited activities are affirmatively authorized, not
all of these features are necessary to affirmatively authorize conduct.
For example, a state may fail to reference the Paraphernalia Control
Act’s authorization exemption but still use positive language that
affirmatively authorizes. This positive, unambiguous language is a core
feature of affirmative authorization. When a statute uses vague or
negative language, such as by enacting an exemption to a prohibition,
the statue’s ultimate effect may be to authorize conduct, but this effect
must be implied.178
2. Affirmative Authorization via Licensure
Licensing regimes offer another form of affirmative
authorization. A license serves as a governmental body’s certification
that the licensee may enjoy certain privileges. As defined by Professors
Eric Biber and J.B. Ruhl, a license is “an administrative agency’s
statutorily authorized, discretionary, judicially reviewable granting of
permission to do that which would otherwise be statutorily
prohibited.”179

176. See id. (“The sole authority of the legislature to make laws is the foundation of the
principle that courts of justice are bound to effect to its intention. When that is plain and palpable
they must follow it implicitly.”); id. at 312 (explaining that intent should be sought “first of all in
the words and language employed; and if the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express
plainly, clearly and distinctly the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is no occasion to
resort to other means of interpretation,” since “[i]t is not allowable to interpret what has no need
of interpretation”); see also Section I.B.1 (discussing legislative history).
177. 21 U.S.C. § 863(f)(1) (2012).
178. See discussion infra Section II.C.1.
179. Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of
Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 146 (2014). Professors Biber
and Ruhl explain that a license (or as they term it, a permit) must meet six elements: it must “(1)
be explicitly delegated or implied by statute, (2) administrative, (3) discretionary, and (4) judicially
reviewable, and that (5) it provide an affirmative grant of permission (6) allowing an act that would
be otherwise statutorily prohibited.” Id. While Biber and Ruhl use the term “permit” in their
article, they note that their definition applies no matter the nomenclature used: “Regardless of
what a form of permission is called—permit, license, certificate, exemption, or something similar—
all six elements must be satisfied for it to be a permit, and if all six elements are satisfied, it is a
permit.” Id. The Administrative Procedures Act likewise specifies that permits and licenses are
both a “form of permission.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (2012) (defining a “license” as “an agency permit,
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Licenses may be general—applicable to a class of persons—or
specific—individually tailored to a single licensee. Specific licenses
require an agency to conduct extensive factfinding and analysis of an
applicant’s particular circumstances before a license issues,180 whereas
general licenses enable an agency to permit an entire class of
individuals to engage in specified activities.181 Holders of general
licenses thus enjoy the privileges of the license with little to no effort,
and the agency avoids an ad hoc, fact-intensive determination.182 Under
either model, the agency issuing the license retains discretion in
determining whether the licensee meets statutorily specified conditions
required for a license to issue.183 In a general licensing regime,
conditions set out in agency promulgations determine whether a person
is issued a license, whereas in a specific licensing regime, the agency
determines on a case-by-case basis whether each licensee has met the
relevant conditions for licensure.184 While they may differ in form, all
licenses share the same core feature: they authorize a licensee to engage
in an activity that is otherwise prohibited.185
Some states and localities have implemented specific licensing
regimes for sales of marijuana paraphernalia. West Virginia, for
example, requires that before selling drug paraphernalia, a business
receive a license to do so from the state tax commissioner.186 A general
business license is insufficient to authorize such sales; a business must
separately obtain a paraphernalia license.187 Washington, meanwhile,
has taken a more general approach to licensing, allowing any business
holding a marijuana retailer license to sell marijuana paraphernalia as
well.188
certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of
permission” (emphasis added)).
180. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 179, at 136–37 (defining specific permits).
181. See id. at 140–41 (describing a general permit as one issued by an agency “on its own
initiative, with no particular applicant before it, that defines a broad category of activity and allows
the entities engaging in that activity to take advantage of the permit with little or no effort on
their part”).
182. See id. at 140.
183. See id. at 144–45 (“[T]here is no room for doubt that, however issued, . . . there is some
degree of discretion involved in how the agency acts.”).
184. See id. at 146–47, 165–66 (distinguishing general and specific permitting systems).
185. Id. at 140–41, 155. Professors Biber and Ruhl also note other common features of licenses:
application to specified activities and actors, a set duration for use, and a requirement that the
regulated party meet certain conditions. Id. at 155.
186. W. VA. CODE § 47-19-1 (2018).
187. See Business Registration – Drug Paraphernalia, W. VA. ST. TAX DEP’T, https://tax.wv.gov/
Business/BusinessRegistration/Pages/BusinessRegistrationDrugParaphernalia.aspx (last visited
Apr. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/A4CC-49HM] (“This license is in addition to the business
registration certificate.”).
188. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-079 (2018).
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Affirmative authorization, unlike other forms of authorization,
requires direct contemplation of the conduct to be authorized. A license
that is only tangentially related to prohibited conduct may, in some
cases, constitute implied authorization, but it does not constitute
affirmative authorization. For example, a license issued by a city zoning
board to an all-purpose retail business, such as a grocery store, will
not affirmatively authorize that business to sell marijuana
paraphernalia.189 This is because the sale of paraphernalia may not
have been contemplated by the body that issued the license. An instance
such as this presents uncertainty as to whether the licensee has in fact
been authorized to engage in prohibited conduct and thus does not
constitute affirmative authorization.
B. Authorization Through Inaction
Taking the broadest view of authorization, the term might mean
merely “to permit” something to occur. Under this view, authorization
would not require any positive action for permission to take hold. A
person would thus be authorized to engage in any activity that is not
regulated or prohibited. One court reasoned that this conception of
authorization made sense given that, “[a]s a matter of rudimentary
logic, if something is explicitly not prohibited, it is permitted.”190
But this interpretation is improper for purposes of authorizing
conduct by law. The Supreme Court agrees and recently explained in
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association that “[a] State is not
regarded as authorizing everything that it does not prohibit or
regulate.”191 When the law speaks of “authorization,” that term “makes
sense only against a backdrop of prohibition or regulation.”192
Decisionmakers, then, should not presume that the law “authorizes”
conduct unless there is an express need for that conduct to be
authorized due to an existing prohibition or regulation. To use an
example posited by the Murphy Court, “no one would say that a State
‘authorizes’ its residents to brush their teeth,” even though that action
is explicitly not prohibited.193 To deem such a trivial action “authorized”
by law would remove any value that a legislature has placed in the
189. See Anderson v. United States, Crim. No. L-00-033, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107118, at *2–
3 (D. Md. Nov. 16, 2009); see also infra note 242 (discussing case).
190. Mich. Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 918 N.W.2d 756, 784 (Mich. 2018) (“The
law is binary in this regard; conduct is either prohibited or it is not; there is not some Alice-inWonderland third realm of the law in which conduct is neither prohibited nor permitted.”).
191. 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1474 (2018).
192. Id. (“We commonly speak of state authorization only if the activity in question would
otherwise be restricted.”).
193. Id.
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word. When a law uses the term “authorized,” it should be assumed that
the enacting legislature intended to give that word meaning, and
adopting a broad view that all that is not prohibited is authorized erases
that meaning.194 Inaction, then, is not an effective means of authorizing
conduct by law.
C. Implied Authorization
Between affirmative authorization and authorization through
inaction lies implied authorization. This form of authorization is not
static; instead, it may manifest itself in diverse ways. This Section
explores three forms that implied authorization may take:
authorization by repeal, authorization by delegation, and authorization
through context.
1. Authorization by Repeal
When a prohibition is repealed or modified, the thing previously
prohibited becomes “authorized.” This is the inverse of affirmative
authorization: rather than affirmatively sanctioning conduct as
permissible by enacting a statute or licensing regime expressly
permitting the conduct, the state is implying that the conduct is
permissible by removing an existing prohibition. This conclusion
follows the Supreme Court’s recent clarification that repeal or
modification of an existing prohibition are sufficient bases for
authorizing conduct by law.195
In Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the
Supreme Court addressed whether actions by New Jersey’s legislature
violated the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(“PASPA”), a federal law that prohibited any state from “authoriz[ing]
by law” sports gambling.196 In 2011, New Jersey voters approved an
amendment to the state’s constitution that allowed the state legislature
to authorize sports gambling,197 and in 2012, in direct contravention of
PASPA, the legislature enacted such a law.198 Amateur and professional
194. See id. (explaining that “[n]o one would use the term” “authorized” to mean inaction).
195. Id.
196. Id.; see also Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, § 3702,
106 Stat. 4227, 4228 (1992) (previously codified at 28 U.S.C. § 3702) (deeming it “unlawful” for any
state “to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law” any form of sports
gambling), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461.
197. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2.
198. Act of Jan. 17, 2012, ch. 231, 2011 N.J. Laws 1723. In court, New Jersey did not deny that
the law conflicted with PASPA; instead, it argued PASPA violated the Tenth Amendment’s
anticommandeering rule by prohibiting states from modifying or repealing their laws. Nat’l

Philips _ PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1372

6/12/2019 11:14 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4:1335

sports leagues challenged the New Jersey statute, and the law was
eventually struck down by the Third Circuit.199 In its decision, the Third
Circuit provided a roadmap for how New Jersey might sidestep
PASPA’s prohibition on “authoriz[ations] by law.”200 The court read
PASPA’s use of the term “authorized” to prohibit “affirmative”
authorizations but not “negative” repeals and explained that New
Jersey could repeal its prohibition without violating federal law.201
The New Jersey legislature listened; in 2014, it repealed
portions of the state’s prohibition on sports gambling.202 The repeal was
challenged and struck down by the Third Circuit.203 Disavowing
portions of the prior panel’s decision, the court found that repeals fit
within the meaning of the term “authorized” and thus violated
PASPA.204 In reaching its decision, the court explained that “the word
‘repeal’ does not prevent us from examining what the provision actually
does,” which was to “grant[ ] permission to certain entities to engage in
sports gambling.”205
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s decision to focus
on the effect of the state’s action rather than the terminology used to
describe that action.206 The Court rejected the narrow definition of
authorization posited by the sports leagues—that “the primary
definition of ‘authorize’ ” means “[t]o empower” and that authorization

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 561–62 (D.N.J. 2013) (“Defendants argue
that PASPA requires New Jersey to prohibit sports wagering in violation of the AntiCommandeering principle set forth in New York v. United States.” (citation omitted)), rev’d sub
nom. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461; see also id. (noting intervenor’s argument “that PASPA violates
principles of federalism through 1) a ‘negative command prohibiting [New Jersey] from enacting
any law legalizing or licensing Sports Betting,’ and 2) an ‘affirmative command requiring [New
Jersey] to maintain State laws criminalizing sports betting.’ ” (alterations in original)).
199. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub
nom. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461.
200. Id. at 231–33.
201. Id. at 232:
We do not see how having no law in place governing sports wagering is the same as
authorizing it by law. . . . [T]he lack of an affirmative prohibition of an activity does not
mean it is affirmatively authorized by law. The right to do that which is not prohibited
derives not from the authority of the state but from the inherent rights of the people.
(emphasis added).
202. Act of Oct. 17, 2014, ch. 62, 2014 N.J. Laws 602, 602.
203. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 396–97 (3d Cir. 2016)
(en banc), rev’d sub nom. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461.
204. Id. (“The word ‘authorize’ means, inter alia, ‘[t]o empower; to give a right or authority to
act,’ or ‘[t]o permit a thing to be done in the future.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990))).
205. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
206. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474 (“When a State completely or partially repeals old laws . . . it
‘authorize[s]’ that activity.” (alteration in original)).
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therefore “requires affirmative action.”207 Instead, it adopted New
Jersey’s definition—that to “authorize” simply means to “permit” and
that, as such, “any state law that has the effect of permitting sports
gambling, including a law totally or partially repealing a prior
prohibition, amounts to an authorization.”208 The Court’s decision
makes clear that the term “authorized” does not connote a requirement
that conduct be affirmatively authorized; instead, conduct can be
authorized based on the ultimate effect of a state action.
Statutory exemptions serve a similar function. By enacting an
exemption, a legislature excludes a specified activity from the need to
obtain permission before engaging in that activity.209 Removing the
need to obtain permission to engage in an activity implies that the
activity is authorized and thus “removes . . . the need to take any
additional steps to establish compliance with the law.”210 While not
framed in positive terms, a statutory exemption still evinces a will by
the legislature to exclude an act from a prohibition. As with repeals, the
effect of a statutory exemption is to imply that the exempted conduct is
authorized. Oregon’s paraphernalia statute presents an example. While
Oregon prohibits the sale, delivery, and manufacture of “drug
paraphernalia,” it expressly removes certain activities related to
marijuana paraphernalia from this prohibition.211 Specifically, Oregon
law provides that the general state prohibition on paraphernalia “do[es]
not apply to a person who sells or delivers marijuana paraphernalia.”212
Through this exemption, the legislature removes specific conduct from
the general prohibition as well as the need to take additional steps to
ensure compliance with Oregon law.213 The effect of this action is to
authorize a person to engage in that conduct.
Authorization by repeal may resemble authorization through
inaction given that both are predicated on a lack of prohibition. But
authorization by repeal requires that a legislature take deliberate steps
to repeal an existing prohibition. In doing so, the legislature expresses
a manifest intent not to prohibit conduct, which has the effect of
authorizing that conduct. Authorization by inaction, on the other hand,
does not involve a legislature taking deliberate action but instead
involves the legislature refraining from taking action and thus does not
indicate an intent sufficient to authorize conduct by law.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 1473 (emphasis added).
See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 179, at 146.
Id.
OR. REV. STAT. § 475.525(1), (5)(a) (2017).
Id. § 475.525(5)(a).
See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 179, at 146.
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2. Authorization by Delegation
Implied authorization and affirmative authorization may
sometimes blur near the edges, as is the case with authorization by
delegation. This form of authorization occurs when Congress delegates
to states the power to take some action and in turn authorizes a state’s
subsequent exercise of that delegated power.214 To be considered a form
of authorization, whether affirmative or implied, a delegated power
must be a grant of permission rather than an affirmative duty to act,
since the term authorization should be understood as providing
permission rather than imposing a requirement.215 When a power is
narrowly and explicitly delegated, such that it specifies all possible
conditions necessary for its exercise, the federal government’s
authorization may appear more affirmative.216
To constitute implied authorization, the state must have some
discretion in how it exercises the delegated power. By providing
discretion, the federal government implicitly authorizes the manner in
which a state chooses to implement that power.217 This occurs when
Congress delegates power using broad or ambiguous terms. By not
providing specifications for how states should exercise their delegated
power, the federal government entrusts the state to work out the details
of the delegation.218 Congressional delegation to administrative
agencies provides an apt analogy: when Congress delegates power to an
agency using board terms, this grant “necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”219
Thus, a congressional delegation of power to states can be
understood as an implicit authorization of a state’s subsequent actions
in exercising that power. Even when Congress does not affirmatively
authorize a specific state action when delegating power, decisionmakers
should construe Congress as implying authorization for a state to fill
214. While I discuss the relationship between federal and state governments here, the
principle holds for smaller polities as well. For example, if a state delegates power to a city to take
some action, the state authorizes the city’s subsequent exercise of that delegation.
215. Cf. Biber & Ruhl, supra note 179, at 147–48 (explaining this concept in the context of
permits).
216. Cf. id. at 146–47.
217. Cf. id. (explaining that, in the context of permits, if a “statute leaves some judgment to
the agency as to whether a qualification is met (for example, whether the applicant is of good
character), the element of discretion is satisfied and the form of permission is a permit”).
218. Cf. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165 (2007) (holding that
“Congress entrust[s] [an] agency to work out” the details of matters related to a congressional
delegation).
219. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (quoting
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
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any gaps and ambiguities left in the delegation.220 The broad language
used in the Paraphernalia Control Act’s authorization exemption, then,
can be understood as an implied authorization by Congress that states
possess discretion in the manner by which they exercise the power
delegated to them.
3. Authorization Through Context
Authorization may also be implied through context. Contextual
authorization occurs when conduct must necessarily be authorized in
order for surrounding and interrelated circumstances to be properly
considered. This commonly occurs when statutes conflict and the proper
reading of one or both statutes requires a finding of authorization.
Authorization is implied in such instances since a contextual and
holistic reading of the statutes together necessitates a finding of
authorization.
Consider how a statute legalizing marijuana use might be read
to impliedly authorize the use of marijuana paraphernalia. As an
example, New Mexico prohibits marijuana use but permits the use of
medical marijuana by qualified patients.221 The state also prohibits the
use and possession of paraphernalia.222 While qualified medical
marijuana patients are affirmatively authorized to possess and use the
substance,223 they are not affirmatively authorized to possess or use
related paraphernalia.224 This means that the general paraphernalia
prohibition applies to qualified patients. A holistic reading of the state’s
marijuana laws might indicate that by authorizing qualified patients to
use marijuana, New Mexico has impliedly authorized those patients to
use and possess marijuana paraphernalia as well. To conclude
otherwise would be to allow qualified patients to use marijuana but to
prohibit them from accessing the instrumentalities necessary for its
use, which thwarts their ability to engage in authorized conduct. For
New Mexico’s medical marijuana law to be given proper effect, then,
there is a colorable argument that marijuana paraphernalia use must
necessarily be impliedly authorized.

220. Cf. Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1285 (2008) (“Put simply,
whether or not Congress has expressly authorized an agency to decide questions of statutory
interpretation, courts must construe gaps and ambiguities in regulatory statutes as implicit
delegations of policymaking authority to administrative agencies.”).
221. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-23(A) (2018).
222. Id. § 30-31-25.1(A)–(B).
223. See id. § 26-2B-4(A).
224. See id. §§ 26-2B-1 to -7.
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A separate state statute buttresses this conclusion. New Mexico
requires that marijuana paraphernalia seized by state law enforcement
officials be immediately returned upon determination that the person
possessing or using the paraphernalia is a “qualified” medical
marijuana patient.225 This statute does not, however, affirmatively
authorize qualified patients to possess or use paraphernalia; it only
requires return of those items when seized. Again, reading the
marijuana laws together would seem to necessarily imply that qualified
patients are authorized to possess and use marijuana paraphernalia. If
this were not the case, then the statute would logically be read to
require law enforcement officials to aid qualified patients in violating
the state paraphernalia prohibition by returning seized paraphernalia.
Authorization may also be implied when it is not included as
part of an affirmative prohibition. For example, Oregon’s paraphernalia
statute makes it “unlawful for a person to sell or deliver . . . marijuana
paraphernalia to a person who is under 21 years of age.”226 By
affirmatively prohibiting paraphernalia sales to a specific class of
persons—persons under twenty-one—the statute makes sense only if it
is implied that the prohibition does not apply to persons outside of that
class—persons over twenty-one. This follows the long-standing
principle of interpretation that enumeration of one class of persons to
be affected by a provision implies the exclusion of unenumerated
classes.227
Because authorization exists along a continuum, the
effectiveness of contextual authorization may vary significantly based
on what circumstances are alleged to imply authorization. To be
authorized through context, the conduct in question must necessarily
be implied by the surrounding circumstances, such that those
circumstances only make sense if the conduct in question is authorized.
Thus, while there is a cognizable argument that New Mexico’s medical
marijuana law and paraphernalia return provision only make sense if
paraphernalia use is impliedly authorized for qualified patients, other
situations purportedly authorizing conduct may be too indirect. For
example, in In re Ultra Trimmer, a trademark applicant was denied
225. See id. § 26-2B-4(G):
Cannabis, paraphernalia or other property seized from a qualified patient or primary
caregiver in connection with the claimed medical use of cannabis shall be returned
immediately upon the determination by a court or prosecutor that the qualified patient
or primary caregiver is entitled to the protections of the provisions of the Lynn and Erin
Compassionate Use Act . . . .
226. OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.376(2) (2017) (emphasis added).
227. SUTHERLAND, supra note 175, at 413 (“Where a statute enumerates the persons or things
to be affected by its provisions, there is an implied exclusion of the other; there is then a natural
inference that its application is not intended to be general.”).
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federal trademark registration because his mark was intended for use
on unlawful marijuana paraphernalia—specifically, a “trimming
machine for trimming leaves, plants, flowers and buds.”228 The
applicant argued that the surge of states legalizing the sale and use of
marijuana necessarily implied that he was authorized to sell his
product and that it was therefore lawful and registrable.229 This
argument was appropriately rejected.230 Such a relationship is too
tangential to warrant a finding that conduct has been contextually
authorized. Contextual authorization requires that parties point to
some direct implication of authorization by identifying a context in
which authorization is necessary for the surrounding circumstances to
be properly understood.
While this Note has analyzed contextual authorization through
the lens of marijuana paraphernalia, the principle holds for other uses
of the term as well. Case law pertaining to the federal Anti-Injunction
Act (“AIA”),231 for example, presents two instances of authorization
through context: (1) authorization of specific conduct that necessarily
follows authorization of more general conduct and (2) authorization in
order to effectuate a law’s broader purpose. The AIA prohibits federal
courts from intervening in state proceedings but includes numerous
exceptions of instances where courts may intervene.232 One exception is
the ability to intervene in state proceedings when doing so has been
“expressly authorized by Act of Congress.”233 This exception created
substantial dispute among courts as to its meaning due to the

228. In re Ultra Trimmer, L.L.C., No. 86479070, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 563, at *1–2 (T.T.A.B.
Nov. 29, 2016).
229. Id. at *13 (detailing the applicant’s argument that because marijuana “has been deemed
lawful to some extent in a total of forty-two states and the District of Columbia,” the use of
equipment for manufacturing marijuana was “by rational extension” also lawful).
230. The panel hearing the matter rejected this argument because the applicant could not
point to an affirmative form of authorization, such as “a license or other manifestation of
authorization from any local, State, or Federal governmental authority.” Id. at *15. It also
determined that despite the applicant’s contention, DOJ guidance documents—specifically the
Obama administration’s Cole Memorandum—provided no refuge for the applicant, since “ ‘policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines’ all ‘lack the force of law.’ ” Id. at *15–16
(quoting In re JJ206, LLC, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1568, 1571 n.18 (T.T.A.B. 2016)). As this Note
has attempted to demonstrate, however, requiring affirmative authorization misunderstands the
term’s range of meanings. While the defendant’s argument was appropriately rejected, the panel
should have provided justifications for doing so other than a simple lack of affirmative
authorization. See discussion infra note 242.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012).
232. Id.; see also Larry C. Vaughan, Comment, Federal Injunctions of State Court Labor
Proceedings, 39 TENN. L. REV. 301 (1972).
233. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
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interpretive difficulty presented by the phrase “expressly
authorized.”234
In interpreting the AIA, the Supreme Court held that
“authorization” need not be affirmative and can instead be implied.235
In Mitchum v. Foster, the Court addressed whether Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 constituted an exception to the AIA.236 Section
1983 allows any person deprived by a state actor of a right conferred by
law to seek redress by bringing a “suit in equity.”237 While Section 1983
does not include any language referring to the AIA and does not
affirmatively authorize conduct prohibited by the AIA, the Mitchum
Court explained that the “express” authorization contemplated in the
AIA could be implied based on whether “an Act of Congress . . . could be
given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding.”238
Because Congress intended Section 1983 to serve as a means of
protection
against
unconstitutional
state
actions—including
unconstitutional judicial actions—Congress must necessarily have
authorized federal stays of state court proceedings when it authorized
“suit[s] in equity,” as this authorization was required to carry out the
law’s protective purpose.239 The Court thus implied authorization on
two bases: first, authorization was implied to effectuate the AIA’s
general purpose, and second, authorization of “suit[s] in equity”
necessarily encompassed authorization of the more specific “federal
injunctive relief against a state court proceeding.”240 The AIA illustrates
that whether an action is “authorized” can be of serious consequence in
the administration of justice, and this significance calls for a more
comprehensive understanding of the term’s many possible meanings.

234. See Vaughan, supra note 232, at 314–15, 317; see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
226 (1972) (explaining that interpretation of the statute has “divided the federal courts”).
Numerous courts have lamented the generally worded provision as “unfortunate.” See, e.g.,
Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 696–97 (2d Cir. 1966) (“[E]xactly what is required by
the statutory term is unclear; the courts are left to bear the burden of uncertainty in construing
language widely recognized to be ‘unfortunate’ to say the least.”).
235. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 237 (“[I]t is evident that, in order to qualify under the ‘expressly
authorized’ exception of the anti-injunction statute, a federal law need not contain an express
reference to that statute. . . . [A] federal law need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state
court proceeding in order to qualify as an exception.”); see also Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955) (noting that “no prescribed formula is required; an
authorization need not expressly refer to § 2283”).
236. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 226.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
238. 407 U.S. at 236–38 (explaining that in order to qualify as “expressly authorized,” a law
need not explicitly refer to the AIA, nor must it authorize prohibited conduct in an affirmative
manner).
239. Id. at 242.
240. Id.
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As this Part has sought to demonstrate, the term “authorized”
should not be narrowly construed; instead, it should be understood as
existing along a continuum of possible meanings. In the abstract, the
word can be taken so far as to mean a mere lack of prohibition. For the
purposes of authorization by law, however, this broad conception of
authorization is unreasonable. But authorization need not be
affirmatively granted either.241 Between authorization by inaction and
affirmative authorization, there exist a plethora of implied forms.
Understanding the wide range of forms that authorization may
take can inform not only how legislation is written but how it is argued
and interpreted as well. Many decisionmakers have failed to recognize
the breadth of possible meanings the term “authorized” can take;
instead, they have read the word narrowly to require explicit,
affirmative action.242 But as the Supreme Court recently clarified in
241. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1474 (2018).
242. For example, in In re Ultra Trimmer, discussed supra notes 228–230, the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board rejected that a trademark applicant’s conduct was impliedly authorized
because he could not point to “a license or other manifestation of authorization from any local,
State, or Federal governmental authority.” In re Ultra Trimmer, L.L.C., No. 86479070, 2016 TTAB
LEXIS 563, at *15 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2016). Of course, the Board had good reason to find the
applicant’s conduct was not impliedly authorized, given that the applicant could not adequately
connect a trend of state marijuana legalization with an implied authority to deal in marijuana
paraphernalia. See id. But requiring the defendant to show authorization through affirmative
means, such as a license, too narrowly construes the forms that authorization may take.
Similarly, in Anderson v. United States, a defendant convicted of violating the Paraphernalia
Control Act for operating a chain of grocery stores that sold drug paraphernalia argued that his
conduct was impliedly authorized because his retail business was licensed by a local zoning board.
Anderson v. United States, Crim. No. L-00-033, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107118, at *2–3, *9 (D. Md.
Nov. 16, 2009). The District of Maryland rejected this argument because there was no evidence of
affirmative authorization; the defendant could “point to no local, state, or Federal laws authorizing
him to possess or distribute drug paraphernalia.” Id. at *10. The defendant also argued that his
conduct was authorized because U.S. Customs and Border Protection had permitted him to import
the paraphernalia at issue. Id. at *9. The court rejected this argument as well, finding that while
the agency had allowed the importation of paraphernalia, it had not affirmatively authorized the
subsequent distribution or sale of the imported items. Id. at *10.
As with the Board’s decision in In re Ultra Trimmer, the Anderson court had good reason to
reject that the defendant was impliedly authorized to engage in federally unlawful conduct: The
retail license upon which the defendant relied was for an all-purpose business—a grocery store—
rather than a marijuana paraphernalia business, see id. at *9, and therefore failed to sufficiently
imply authorization since paraphernalia had not been contemplated at the time the license was
issued. Further, the court may have reasoned that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s
permission to import paraphernalia did not imply authorization to engage in other activities, since
the agency may not have sufficiently contemplated the subsequent sale and distribution of that
imported paraphernalia. Id. These reasons may warrant rejecting that the defendant was
impliedly authorized, but they should be explicated. Instead, the court failed to provide
justifications for rejecting the implied authorization argument and broadly concluded that a lack
of affirmative authorization meant that the defendant did not fall within the Paraphernalia
Control Act’s scope. Id. By rejecting the possibility that conduct may be impliedly authorized,
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Murphy, this interpretation is flawed and places too much emphasis on
form rather than substance.243 This Note aims to better equip courts in
interpreting the term “authorized” by presenting a framework of the
permissible forms that authorization may take.
Whether a specific form of authorization is effective will depend
on the law at issue. Because there are different paths to authorizing
conduct, courts will need to look at the law holistically and
pragmatically when interpreting the term.244 To illustrate how this
might be done, the next Part analyzes the term “authorized” as it used
in the Paraphernalia Control Act.
III. AUTHORIZING CONDUCT PROHIBITED BY THE
PARAPHERNALIA CONTROL ACT
As the previous Part demonstrated, “authorization” can be
understood as existing along a continuum. The forms that occur along
this continuum will inevitably vary in their degree of effectiveness. This
Part analyzes how the different forms of authorization that stretch the
continuum might fare for purposes of authorizing conduct under the
Paraphernalia Control Act and analyzes whether the anticipated
results make normative sense.

decisionmakers evince a general misunderstanding of the range of meanings that the term
“authorized” can take. Even when decisionmakers reach the same result, they should ground their
determinations in reasons for rejecting implied authorization rather basing them on a rejection of
implied authorization as a permissible means of authorizing conduct.
243. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474.
244. Of course, analyzing the language used in a statute is always the first step in statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (“The
starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language.”); see also Morell E.
Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 6–
9 (2003) (explaining that looking for a “plain meaning” is often the first step courts take when
interpreting statutes). But other indicia must also be examined to accurately determine a law’s
meaning. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 416–17 (1989) (“Statutory terms are not self-defining, and words have no meaning before or
without interpretation. . . . [S]tatutory terms are indeterminate standing ‘by themselves,’ and,
even more important, they never stand by themselves. The significance of congressional
enactments necessarily depends on the context and on background understandings about how
words should be understood.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 984
(1995) (arguing that a holistic approach to interpretation is necessary because “the nature of
language” means that “legal rules will leave a variety of gaps and ambiguities; there will be no
ordinary or literal meaning in many cases”); see also Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306–07 (1893)
(“[D]ictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding
of the court.”); Phillip A. Rubin, Note, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in
Accordance with Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J. 167, 191 (2010) (explaining that dictionaries
“should be used only to say what a word could mean, not what it must mean”).
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A. Affirmative Authorization
Affirmative authorization offers the most reliable means for
authorizing conduct under the Paraphernalia Control Act’s
authorization exemption. Few decisionmakers have analyzed the
authorization exemption, but of those that have, there is a tendency to
require affirmative authorization. When presented with arguments
that a defendant’s conduct is implicitly authorized, courts often reject
the possibility of implied authorization without explication.245 Of
course, these cases may have come out differently had they been decided
after the Murphy Court’s pronouncement that authorization need not
be affirmative.246 Even still, case law indicates a preference for a
showing that authorization has been affirmatively granted.
Provisions of the CSA related to the Paraphernalia Control Act
also suggest that courts may require litigants to point to more
affirmative forms of authorization to fall within the authorization
exemption’s scope.247 The CSA’s departure from traditional burden of
proof rules is one such provision. While criminal statutes typically
require the government to prove a defendant is not protected by a
statutory exemption,248 the CSA mandates that defendants invoking
statutory exemptions bear the burden of proving the exemption’s
application using clear and convincing evidence.249 Any exemption

245. See cases discussed supra note 242.
246. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474.
247. See GREENAWALT, supra note 57, at 27 (explaining that when courts find that a statute’s
wording does not provide a clear directive, they must next examine other provisions of the same
statute); SUTHERLAND, supra note 175, at 317–18 (“[T]he most natural exposition of a statute [is]
to construe one part by another, for that expresses the meaning of the makers . . . . The words and
meanings of one part may lead to and furnish an explanation of the sense of another.”); see also
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 273 (2006) (employing this method of interpretation in the
context of the CSA).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971) (“It is a general guide to the
interpretation of criminal statutes that when an exception is incorporated in the enacting clause
of a statute, the burden is on the prosecution to plead and prove that the defendant is not within
the exception.”); United States v. Matthews, 749 F.3d 99, 104–05 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that
the typical burden rules do not apply to the CSA based on Congress’s clear intent in establishing
otherwise).
249. See 21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1) (2012):
It shall not be necessary for the United States to negative any exemption or exception
set forth in this subchapter in any complaint, information, indictment, or other pleading
or in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this subchapter, and the burden of
going forward with the evidence with respect to any such exemption or exception shall
be upon the person claiming its benefit.;
see also United States v. Hill, 935 F.2d 196, 199–200 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he burden of going
forward to prove a statutory exception is on the defendant. Once the defendant has produced clear
and convincing evidence that the conduct fits within an exception, the burden of persuasion is on
the government.”).
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under the CSA is thus treated as an affirmative defense “ ‘rather than
an element of the offense’ for the government to prove.”250 This high
standard of proof suggests that for purposes of the Paraphernalia
Control Act, courts may refuse to imply authorization and may instead
require that defendants establish affirmative authorization.
Courts and other decisionmakers have largely failed to provide
a rationale for requiring affirmative authorization, and the possible
justifications for requiring such a demanding form are unconvincing.
For example, there may be concerns that determining whether conduct
has been “authorized” is administratively difficult. In this case, a court
might consider an affirmative statement of authorization more
appealing than an implication of authorization since this would avoid
the difficulty of analyzing the surrounding circumstances to determine
whether authorization has been implied. But decisionmakers are
frequently tasked with analyzing a situation to determine whether a
statutory condition has been met,251 and the Paraphernalia Control
Act’s authorization exemption should be treated no differently.
Moreover, the stakes that attach to a finding of authorization in the
context of a criminal statute such as the Paraphernalia Control Act
warrant a court’s full attention.252 As noted above, the authorization
exemption is treated as an affirmative defense,253 and one would expect
courts to fully analyze whether a defendant may employ that defense,
even if doing so is inconvenient.
Another possible rationale involves the error costs associated
with erroneously authorizing conduct.254 Legal decisionmaking often
involves weighing the costs of Type I errors (wrongful determinations
that favor plaintiffs or prosecutors, such as an erroneous conviction)
against the costs of Type II errors (wrongful determinations that favor
defendants, such as an erroneous acquittal).255 In the context of the
250. Matthews, 749 F.3d at 104 (quoting United States v. Forbes, 515 F.2d 676, 680 n.9 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)); see also United States v. Polan, 970 F.2d 1280, 1282–83, 1283 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding that for CSA-related crimes, the burden is not on the government to prove that a
defendant lacks authorization).
251. See, e.g., Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474.
252. See supra Section I.C.1 (discussing penalties for violating the Paraphernalia Control Act).
253. See supra notes 248–250 and accompanying text.
254. See Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of Legal Burdens, 1997 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 5 (“Error costs are the social costs associated with erroneous legal judgments and are a
function of several variables.”).
255. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1521 (2001) (“Systems that operate under uncertainty always balance type I and type II
errors . . . .”). This is well understood in the criminal context, see Mark Glover, Probate-Error Costs,
49 CONN. L. REV. 613, 622–24 (2016), but occurs in the civil context as well. See, e.g., Matthew D.
Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 634–37 (2018)
(discussing decisionmakers’ balancing of error costs in corporate litigation); Jonathan R. Macey &
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Paraphernalia Control Act, decisionmakers’ insistence on a showing of
affirmative authorization may be motivated by a fear of committing
Type II errors—that is, decisionmakers may be wary of mistakenly
finding a party authorized and thus erroneously allowing that party to
avoid the Act’s penalties. But this potential rationale is inadequate
given that the substantial risk of Type I errors in this context should be
weighed more heavily than the risk of Type II errors.256 Where criminal
penalties are involved, it is well understood that erroneously subjecting
a party to those penalties through Type I errors is worse than
erroneously allowing a party to avoid the penalties through Type II
errors.257 In other words, forcing a party to face the Paraphernalia
Control Act’s host of enumerated penalties, including imprisonment, by
erroneously finding the party not authorized is more dangerous than
the alternative. Indeed, balancing the potential error costs associated
with a determination of whether a party is authorized should militate
toward decisionmakers implementing a more lenient standard when
interpreting whether an alleged authorization meets the Paraphernalia
Control Act’s exemption.258
Should states choose the certainty of affirmative authorization,
they have two routes for authorizing conduct using this form: enacting
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 647, 662–65 (1992) (statutory interpretation); Joseph Scott Miller, Error Costs & IP Law,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 178–79 (intellectual property).
256. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1504–05 (1999) (“[B]ecause the cost to an innocent defendant of criminal punishment may
well exceed the social benefit of one more conviction of a guilty person . . . , Type I errors are more
serious than Type II errors in criminal cases and therefore are weighted more heavily . . . .”);
Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 487 (2000) (“The wrongful
conviction of an innocent defendant (a ‘false positive’) is much costlier than the wrongful acquittal
of a criminal (a ‘false negative’).”).
257. See Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 72 (2008) (“Under the
prevalent moral vision, it is better to acquit a guilty defendant than to convict and punish an
innocent person.”); see also Glover, supra note 255, at 624 (“The law tilts the scales of justice [in
favor of criminal defendants] out of recognition that a false-positive outcome in the form of a
wrongful conviction is worse [than] a false-negative outcome in the form of an erroneous
acquittal.”).
258. See Lee, supra note 254, at 25–27 (explaining that the asymmetric balance of error costs
accounts for higher standard of proof requirements in criminal proceedings). The balance of error
costs may be asymmetrical in noncriminal cases, as well, and may warrant a more burdensome
standard of proof “because of the perceived hardships resulting from an error.” Id. at 27. The
greater these perceived hardships, “the stricter the procedural and decisional requirements
authorizing the denial of a person’s liberty or property.” Stein, supra note 257, at 70–71 (“This
‘least harm principle’ animates the Supreme Court’s constitutional requirements for procedures
and decisions in both criminal and civil trials. . . . In the domain of decisionmaking, [these
requirements] regulate the imposition of decisional risks by the rules allocating the burden of
proof.”). As such, the unenumerated consequences that attach to violations of the Paraphernalia
Control Act may warrant stricter procedures related to deprivation if the hardships accompanying
those consequences are determined to be sufficiently burdensome.
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a statute or implementing a licensing regime. A statutory form of
affirmative authorization is of course the most reliable means of
authorizing conduct. California’s paraphernalia statute provides
guidance for other states looking to authorize conduct prohibited by the
Paraphernalia Control Act.259 The law implements a number of features
that unambiguously authorize conduct: it specifies that conduct
prohibited by the Paraphernalia Control Act is “lawful”;260 defines
paraphernalia so as to parallel the Paraphernalia Control Act’s
definition;261 codifies an express “intent[ ] to meet the requirements” of
the Act, to which it includes a citation; and copies the language used by
the authorization exemption, specifying that it “authoriz[es], under
state law,” the prohibited conduct.262 The elements included in
California’s paraphernalia law plainly direct a decisionmaker to find
that the state has employed the authorization exemption.
Decisionmakers have not unequivocally answered whether both
authorization via statute and authorization via licensure would
sufficiently constitute authorization by law.263 Reading the CSA in its
entirety, however, suggests that a licensing regime would be sufficient
to place a litigant within the authorization exemption’s scope. While
manufacture and distribution of controlled substances are prohibited,
the CSA provides that the Attorney General may, upon application,
“authorize” pharmacists and researchers to dispense or conduct
research with controlled substances.264 The Attorney General may also
revoke this authorization if an actor’s state-issued license has been
suspended, revoked, or denied by the state.265 According to the CSA, a
suspended, revoked, or denied license means that an actor is “no longer
authorized by State law” to manufacture or distribute controlled

259. See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing California’s paraphernalia law).
260. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1(a)(5) (West 2019) (“[I]t shall be lawful under
state and local law . . . for persons 21 years of age or older to . . . [p]ossess, transport, purchase,
obtain, use, manufacture, or give away cannabis accessories to persons 21 years of age or older
without any compensation whatsoever.”).
261. Id. § 11018.2.
262. Id. § 11362.1(b) (codifying an intention “to meet the requirements of subsection (f) of
Section 863 of Title 21 of the United States Code (21 U.S.C. Sec. 863(f)) by authorizing, under state
law, any person in compliance with this section to manufacture, possess, or distribute cannabis
accessories”).
263. The District of Maryland, for instance, rejected that the defendant’s license authorized
conduct and, in doing so, failed to express whether a license could ever be sufficient to do so.
Anderson v. United States, Crim. No. L-00-033, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107118 (D. Md. Nov. 16,
2009); see supra note 242. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, on the other hand, has
indicated that a license would be sufficient to authorize conduct. In re Ultra Trimmer, L.L.C., No.
86479070, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 563, at *15 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2016).
264. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2012).
265. Id. § 824(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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substances.266 This provision indicates that a valid state-issued license
is sufficient to constitute “authoriz[ation] by State law.” Reading the
CSA holistically, marijuana paraphernalia enterprises holding valid
state licenses that contemplate paraphernalia should be considered
“authorized” by law to engage in conduct the Paraphernalia Control Act
otherwise prohibits.
To increase the likelihood that a license meets the authorization
exemption, states should directly relate the license to the conduct
prohibited by the Paraphernalia Control Act.267 Both specific and
general licenses may be appropriate for authorizing conduct under the
Act. A general licensing regime—that is, one that applies to a class of
persons—might involve, for instance, a state agency issuing licenses to
sell marijuana paraphernalia to all persons licensed to operate
dispensaries.268 A specific licensing regime, on the other hand, would
involve an individually tailored determination of whether an applicant
may be granted a license. A hybrid system could exist as well, in which
those who do not receive a license through the general licensing scheme
are permitted to apply for an individual license. Because states with
legalized marijuana already delegate authority to state agencies to
license dispensaries, implementing a paraphernalia licensing regime
would pose few administrative or fiscal burdens. The same agency that
oversees marijuana dispensaries could also oversee marijuana
paraphernalia enterprises, and many of the processes used for licensing
dispensaries could be translated to the paraphernalia context.
States may find that a licensing regime offers benefits not
encompassed by statutory authorization. A primary benefit of using a
licensing regime is the ability to collect excise taxes and application fees
from marijuana paraphernalia businesses.269 Licensing also allows
states to change the conditions of licensure and implement product
standards more easily than through a statutory regime. A licensing
regime could be changed through rather informal agency actions,
whereas a statutory regime would require amendment by the
legislature. Moreover, a licensing regime enables states to ensure
licensees are abiding by state marijuana laws. States are better
equipped to, for example, police sales to minors under a licensing
266. Id.
267. See supra Section II.A.2 (explaining that affirmative authorization via licensure requires
direct contemplation of the conduct to be authorized).
268. Of course, the agency would need to retain some discretion in issuing the license in order
for it to be considered a license rather than a statutory mandate. Biber & Ruhl, supra note 179, at
146. The agency’s promulgation of general licensing conditions—in this example, being licensed to
operate a dispensary—meets this requirement. Id.
269. See JIM LEITZEL, REGULATING VICE: MISGUIDED PROHIBITIONS AND REALISTIC CONTROLS
161–62 (2008) (arguing that licensing is necessary to collect excise taxes).

Philips _ PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1386

6/12/2019 11:14 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4:1335

regime than under a statutory regime.270 The threat of revocation may
also increase regulatory compliance by the licensee in ways that a
statutory regime cannot.271
As between the different licensing regimes available to a state,
a specific regime with individually tailored licenses may allow a greater
degree of flexibility than general licenses. Specific licenses allow for
more control over which applicants are authorized and allow the issuing
agency to negotiate specific terms with the applicant.272 This discretion
better enables a state to police the quality of marijuana-related
paraphernalia sold and the actions of the licensed enterprises. Policing
the quality of the paraphernalia on the market protects the public by
ensuring that marijuana paraphernalia consumers are not sold unsafe
products.273 Quality control also provides reputational benefits to
licensees since a license issued by a state agency can serve as a “stamp
of approval” used to signal product quality to consumers. General
licenses, on the other hand, are less administratively burdensome, as
the act of licensing occurs primarily at the rulemaking stage and does
not involve a fact-intensive inquiry into whether a license should
issue.274
A state may also choose to combine these two regimes by
enacting a statute similar to California’s but stipulating that persons
are only authorized if they are licensed by a specified state agency. A
hybrid system of authorization allows states to benefit from the
certainty of statutory authorization while also benefiting from the
control over those authorized that a licensing regime offers.
B. Authorization Through Inaction
Authorization through inaction is the least likely form to
constitute authorization for purposes of the Paraphernalia Control Act.
Under this form of authorization, a party is considered authorized to
engage in conduct by virtue of that conduct lacking regulation or
270. See Mikos, supra note 149, at 18 (explaining that licensing regimes for marijuana
dispensaries are designed to, among other things, “prevent unlawful sales to minors”).
271. See LEITZEL, supra note 269, at 162 (“With licenses highly valued, license holders will be
reluctant to risk losing their license through inappropriate actions, including failure to enforce the
various regulations governing vice sale and consumption.”). This threat also serves to increase
regulatory compliance by the public by placing licensees in enforcement roles.
272. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 179, at 169 (detailing the features of specific licenses).
273. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICYMAKERS 11 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_
report_final_nonembargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FSK-7RSK] (noting that occupational licenses are
beneficial when “low-quality practitioners” can inflict harm and consumers cannot evaluate a
provider’s quality).
274. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 179, at 164–66 (distinguishing general and specific licenses).
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prohibition. For marijuana paraphernalia, this form of authorization is
likely inapplicable because most if not all states have previously
prohibited or regulated paraphernalia in some manner. Even if a state
has never prohibited or regulated paraphernalia, decisionmakers are
unlikely to find inaction sufficient to meet the Paraphernalia Control
Act’s requirement that conduct be “authorized by law.”275 Considering
inaction as constituting authorization “by law” might create unintended
consequences for interpreting other uses of the term “authorized,” and
it is unclear whether any court would risk such consequences.
Normatively, one might wonder whether this makes sense for
states that have not prohibited or regulated marijuana paraphernalia.
For example, if a state has banned paraphernalia for a number of
controlled substances but has refrained from including marijuana
paraphernalia in that prohibition, marijuana paraphernalia’s exclusion
should not be read as an accident.276 Instead, the state should be
understood as likely intending to permit citizens to engage in conduct
related to marijuana paraphernalia. In these circumstances, there is a
colorable argument that the state has authorized, through inaction,
conduct related to marijuana paraphernalia. This instance of possible
authorization blurs slightly with authorization that occurs through
context, since the surrounding circumstances—that is, the express
prohibition on other forms of paraphernalia—inform how marijuana
paraphernalia’s exclusion from the prohibition should be interpreted.
C. Implied Authorization
Relying on implied authorization for purposes of the
Paraphernalia Control Act will likely result in varying degrees of
effectiveness. Case law indicates judicial apprehension to authorizing
conduct implicitly, but these cases were largely decided before the
Supreme Court clarified that authorization need not be affirmative.277
There is likely to be disagreement among courts and other
decisionmakers as to what forms of implied authorization are sufficient
for purposes of the Paraphernalia Control Act.

275. 21 U.S.C. § 863(f)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
276. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 175, at 413 (“Where a statute enumerates the persons or
things to be affected by its provisions, there is an implied exclusion of the other; there is then a
natural inference that its application is not intended to be general.”).
277. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, Crim. No. L-00-033, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107118
(D. Md. Nov. 16, 2009); CannaKorp, Inc. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2017); In re Ultra Trimmer, L.L.C., No. 86479070, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 563 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2016);
see also Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1473–74 (2018).

Philips _ PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1388

6/12/2019 11:14 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4:1335

Some forms of implied authorization are more easily reconciled
with the authorization exemption. Authorization by repeal, for
example, should be considered sufficient to meet the exemption
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy.278 Thus, a state’s
repeal of a prohibition on activities related to marijuana paraphernalia
should imply that the state has authorized those activities. This sort of
repeal would likely entail a state removing marijuana paraphernalia
from a statute prohibiting paraphernalia. Similarly, a statutory
exemption, such as Oregon’s marijuana paraphernalia exemption,
should be considered sufficient authorization.279
Ultimately, affirmative authorization offers states a more
certain path for shutting off the Paraphernalia Control Act’s
prohibition, since implied authorization may allow courts to avoid a
finding that conduct is “authorized.” Of course, one would not expect all
arguments of implied authorization to meet the authorization
exemption. For example, a decisionmaker is not likely to find that
legalization of marijuana without any reference to paraphernalia
constitutes authorization. Although, there is a colorable argument that
legalizing marijuana use implies the ability to access the
instrumentalities necessary for its use.280 But even if a decisionmaker
was receptive to finding that marijuana legalization implied
authorization of marijuana paraphernalia activities, it would likely
only find that legalization implied the authorization to possess and use
paraphernalia, not the sale, distribution, or manufacture of
paraphernalia.
Even a law that authorizes certain activities related to
marijuana paraphernalia is unlikely to be interpreted as authorizing
other, unenumerated paraphernalia-related activities, regardless of
whether context suggests they should be authorized. For example, if a
state authorizes the sale of paraphernalia, there is a plausible
argument that the state has authorized the distribution and possibly
even the manufacture of paraphernalia as well. To sell paraphernalia
requires the ability to transport it and necessarily implies that some
actor is manufacturing that paraphernalia. In this context, it seems
that the authorization of sales would contextually authorize
paraphernalia manufacture and distribution—if not, businesses would
be provided the ability to sell paraphernalia but prevented from making
it themselves or procuring it from a third party. But decisionmakers

278. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1473–74; see supra Section II.C.1.
279. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.525(5)(a) (2017).
280. See supra Section II.C.3.
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may nonetheless be reluctant to allow these activities if not expressly
enumerated.
Normatively, it seems that decisionmakers should be receptive
to at least some instances of implied authorization and should defer to
the intent evinced by state authorities where appropriate. General
principles of delegation support permitting implied authorization.
Delegating power to take some action to subordinate units of
government demonstrates Congress’s decision to provide those
subordinate units of government with a certain degree of autonomy.281
This delegation evinces a desire for subordinate governments to
implement policies that satisfy the preferences and values of their
citizens.282 This desire should be respected by decisionmakers when
determining whether a state has authorized conduct otherwise
prohibited by the Paraphernalia Control Act. And while congressional
motivation for the authorization exemption is uncertain, it is evident
that Congress presumed that state regulations might displace the
federal legislative scheme. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that
the CSA “explicitly contemplates a role for the States in regulating
controlled substances.”283 This is evidenced by the CSA’s reverse
preemption clause, which disclaims regulation for any “subject matter
which would otherwise be within the authority of the State.”284 Through
its enactment of the authorization exemption, Congress expressly
placed paraphernalia-related activities within states’ authority, and
thus disclaimed regulation should states choose to employ the
authorization exemption. Whether states choose to authorize conduct
in an affirmative manner or more implicitly, decisionmakers should
defer to the state’s intent after holistically analyzing the circumstances
surrounding a purported authorization.

281. See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 106 (1990)
(theorizing the reasons for federal delegations of authority to subordinate governmental units).
282. See id.; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and
the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 210 (1997) (“Congress delegates power to states, moreover,
in order to satisfy preferences for state-level regulation and for state citizens’ values.”).
283. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 251 (2006). In Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court found that
an Oregon statute permitting the use of controlled substances in physician-assisted suicides could
not be preempted by the CSA. Id. at 248–49, 270–71. The Oregon laws were, according to the
Court, “an example of the state regulation . . . that the CSA presupposes.” Id. at 271.
284. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012):
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part
of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal
penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between
that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently
stand together.
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CONCLUSION
Congress places myriad prohibitions on citizens’ conduct but
sometimes delegates to states the power to “authorize” persons to
engage in the conduct covered by those prohibitions. Whether a party is
considered “authorized” holds much significance, as illustrated by the
Paraphernalia Control Act’s enumerated penalties and automatically
attaching consequences. Despite the weight that the law places on
whether a person is “authorized,” that term’s meaning is underexplored
and not fully understood.
This Note has sought to demonstrate through lens of the
Paraphernalia Control Act that authorization exists along a continuum
of possible meanings. On one end of the continuum lies affirmative
authorization and on the other end lies authorization through inaction.
But these are not the only two forms that authorization may take;
between these two ends lie more implied forms of authorization. As this
Note has shown, authorization need not be affirmative to be effective.
Instead, whether a particular form of authorization is sufficient to
“authorize by law” will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
While this Note has focused on how the term “authorized” should
be understood for purposes of employing the Paraphernalia Control
Act’s authorization exemption, the importance of a nuanced
understanding is not so limited. Diverse areas of law implicate the
term, and innumerable stakeholders are affected by how it is
interpreted. Understanding authorization as existing along a
continuum will allow decisionmakers to more accurately determine
whether a party is authorized to engage in prohibited conduct and will
ensure that state law is properly effectuated.
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